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Abstract
This thesis consists of three manuscripts that analyze the role of finan-
cial intermediation in the Great Recession from both a microeconomic and
macroeconomic perspective. Although these papers differ in the adopted
methodologies, they share the substantial idea that, to evaluate the real
effects of the last recession, we need a deeper study of the role of the fi-
nancial intermediation sector.
The first chapter of this thesis is joint work with L. D’Aurizio and L. Ro-
mano. It documents the credit allocation by Italian banks following the
failure of Lehman Brothers. The empirical analysis reveals that Italian
family firms experienced a significantly smaller contraction in granted
loans than non-family firms. It is showed that the difference in the amount
of credit granted to family and non-family firms is related to an increased
role for soft information in Italian banks’ operations.
The second chapter, joint work with D. Menno, quantifies the welfare ef-
fects of the drop in aggregate house prices for leveraged and un-leveraged
households in the Great Recession. It features a dynamic general equilib-
rium model calibrated to the U.S. economy and simulates the 2007-2009
Great Recession as a contemporaneous shock to the financial intermedia-
tion sector and aggregate income. The estimates show that borrowers lost
significantly more in terms of welfare than savers. In counter-factual ex-
periments it has showed that this loss is larger the higher the households’
leverage.
The third chapter documents the relation between bank performance in
the 2007-2008 financial crisis and CEO monetary incentives in a cross-
country analysis. Results suggest that the sensitivity of CEOs’ stock-option
portfolios to share prices (option delta) in 2006 have strong predictive
power for ex-post bank performance. By exploiting the cross-country vari-
ability in financial regulation, results show that incentives to take risk
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given by stock options are stronger in countries with explicit deposit insur-
ance and weaker in countries with highest monitoring by outside stake-
holders.
ii
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Preface
I started my graduate studies in September 2008, at the time of the failure
of Lehman Brothers. This event, together with the collapse of the US and
many European economies, fostered my curiosity of young researcher in
studying the causes of the crisis and its consequences on households and
firms. The three papers that follow are meant to contribute in this respect,
offering the reader some new findings with a clear empirical and quanti-
tative flavor.
Chapter 1, entitled ”Family firms, soft information and bank lending in a fi-
nancial crisis” documents the credit allocation by Italian banks following
the failure of Lehman Brothers using very detailed data about firm-bank
credit relations. The analysis reveals that family firms experienced a sig-
nificantly smaller contraction in granted loans than non-family firms. Re-
sults are robust to different specifications of the econometric model, which
aimed to exclude plausible confounding factors related to family firm sta-
tus and to time-varying bank fixed effects. By exploiting banks’ hetero-
geneity in lending practices, it is showed that the difference in the amount
of credit granted to family and non-family firms is related to an increased
role for soft information in Italian banks’ operations. Finally, by identi-
fying a match between the banks that increased the role of soft informa-
tion and family firms, it has been controlled for firms’ time-varying un-
observed heterogeneity and validated the hypothesis that the results are
supply driven.
Chapter 2, entitled ”Financial Intermediation, House Prices, and the Welfare
1
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Effects of the U.S. Great Recession” quantifies the welfare effects of the drop
in aggregate house prices for leveraged and un-leveraged households in
the US Great Recession. To address the research question, it is showed a
dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the U.S. economy. Con-
sistently with empirical evidence, the 2007-2009 Great Recession has been
simulated as a contemporaneous shock to interest rate spreads and aggre-
gate income. The estimates show that borrowers lost significantly more in
terms of welfare than savers. In counter-factual experiments it has been
found that this loss is larger the higher the households’ leverage. This last
effect comes from non-linearity that is absent in a model with an always
binding collateral constraint (i.e. constant leverage).
Chapter 3, entitled ”CEO compensation, credit crisis and financial regulation: a
cross-country analysis” documents the relation between bank performance
in the 2007-2008 financial crisis and CEO monetary incentives in a cross-
country analysis. CEO incentives have been measured by their compen-
sation at the onset of the crisis (2006). Results suggest that the sensitiv-
ity of CEOs’ stock-option portfolios to share prices (option delta) in 2006
have strong predictive power for ex-post bank performance; higher option
delta is in fact related to a reduced stock return and higher stock return
volatility. The sample allows the study of the interaction between CEO
monetary incentives and financial regulation at country level. The evi-
dence suggests that the risk-shifting incentives given by stock options are
stronger in countries with explicit deposit insurance and weaker in coun-
tries with highest monitoring by outside stakeholders. It is finally showed
that a better alignment between CEO and shareholder incentives, through
insider ownership, is related to lower stock return volatility.
2
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Chapter 1
Family firms, soft information
and bank lending in a financial
crisis
with Leandro D’Aurizio (Bank of Italy) and
Livio Romano (Confindustria)
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1.1 Introduction
The global financial crisis in 2008 and the subsequent recession in the
world economy highlighted that capital markets can represent an impor-
tant source of business cycle fluctuations.1 Adverse shocks hitting the
banking sector propagate to the real economy through a reduction in credit
supply. In particular, an increase in asymmetric information problems in
the bank-firm relationship tend to amplify negative shocks, by dispropor-
tionately affecting some types of borrowers more than others (Bernanke et
al. (1996)). Problems of moral hazard (Holmstrom and Tirole (1997)) and
adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) make lenders less willing to
supply credit to firms facing high agency costs.
Information asymmetry in the borrower-lender relationship is typically
lower for banks than for public debt-holders; while the latter must rely
mostly, if not exclusively, on publicly available information (balance-sheets,
ratings, etc., the so-called hard information), the former have access to
“inside” information, which is transmitted through repeated interactions
between the loan officer and the firm’s manager (Fama (1985); Diamond
(1989); Petersen and Rajan (1994)). Such information relates to the lending
officer’s subjective evaluation of the firm’s creditworthiness and is com-
monly labeled as soft (Berger and Udell (2002); Petersen (2004)). Soft in-
formation is an important determinant of corporate lending, especially for
small businesses (Garcia-Appendini (2011)). In addition, it has been re-
cently shown that it helps to mitigate the adverse consequences of aggre-
gate credit contractions (Jiangli et al. (2008); De Mitri et al. (2010)). The
reason is that hard information, such as past results and standardized risk
measures, are less powerful in predicting firm risk profiles during a crisis.
Soft information about a firm’s pending results and future plans can re-
duce this uncertainty, as it is continuously updated and more targeted to
the characteristics of the borrower.
1See Quadrini (2011) for a review.
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However, despite the interest of scholars in examining the importance of
soft information in banks’ lending decisions, it is still unclear which types
of firms can benefit most from an established relation with a bank. In this
paper, we address this issue by focussing on firms’ heterogeneity in cor-
porate ownership structure, namely the existence of a family block-holder
within the company. In particular, we address the following empirical
question: does the existence of a family block-holder mitigate bank-firm
agency conflicts during a financial crisis? The answer is strongly related to
differences in the incentive structures of family and non-family firms, and
thus to the problem of risk-shifting potentially faced by banks (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)).
Burkart et al. (2003), and more recently Bandiera et al. (2012), highlighted
the fact that family block-holders attach a value to firm control which is
not only represented by the monetary return of their investment, but also
includes an amenity component, that is, utility gained though control per
se. This amenity component can be thought as the personal status acquired
thanks to the identification of the family name with the firm’s success, or
as the desire to transfer the firm to descendants. It translates into higher
non-monetary costs of default that lowers the incentive to strategically de-
fault (Anderson et al. (2003)). On the other hand, as pointed out by Vil-
lalonga and Amit (2005), Ellul et al. (2009) and Lins et al. (2013), family
block-holders may have a higher incentive to extract private benefits from
the firm at the expenses of the other shareholders and of the stakehold-
ers2. In fact, in contrast to the case with non-family block-holders, the
gains from misbehavior are concentrated in the hands of a single family
group.
In a financial crisis, a lower expected return to investments can exacer-
bate the incentive to divert resources out of the company, thus reducing a
2All these papers focus their empirical investigation on listed firms, which are charac-
terized by the existence of agency conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders.
Our analysis, instead, regards firms that are smaller in size and very few went public.
Accordingly, this type of agency conflict is less of a concern in the present context.
5
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family firm’s investment in the future, and lowering the probability that
it will repay its loans. On the other side, family firms may be perceived
as more creditworthy by banks because of the lower incentive to default
in the future. The evaluation of the overall impact of family ownership on
credit allocation will depend on the distribution of “good” and “bad” fam-
ily firms relative to non-family ones. Therefore, even if the family status of
firms is observable to all banks, only soft information, collected through
personal interactions with firms’ managers, can enable a loan officer to
assess whether, given the same publicly available characteristics, a fam-
ily firm is more creditworthy than a non-family one. In other words, soft
information complements hard information by revealing the different ob-
jective functions of family and non-family firms.
We answer our research question by using highly detailed data from the
Credit Register (CR), which covers all loans granted to non-financial firms
by the universe of banks operating in Italy. This information is matched
with firm-specific data, including the identification of family status. In our
analysis we are able to include family firms of different sizes, including
SMEs (small and medium sized enterprises), for which detailed informa-
tion on corporate structure is not typically available. We cover the 2007-
2009 period, which enables to compare results before and after the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy. The choice of October 2008 as the start of the finan-
cial crisis is driven by the nature of the shock represented by the Lehman
Brothers failure. This event was exogenous and largely unexpected by Ital-
ian banks, inducing a lower propensity to lend (Albertazzi and Marchetti
(2010)). At the same time, capital shortages characterizing the onset of the
financial crisis of many OECD economies, were not a major concern for
Italy (but also Japan), where banks relied primarily on resident deposits
and less on wholesale funding3.
For the purpose of our analysis, Italy represents an ideal laboratory. Firstly,
3See Panetta et al. (2009) for a cross-country comparison and the Financial Stability
Assessment of the IMF (2013) for a focus on the Italian banking system during the crisis.
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bank lending represents the most important category of debt for firms
in the sample (85% of total debts) both for family and non-family firms.
Moreover, there was substantial heterogeneity in the use of soft informa-
tion by Italian banks following the crisis. By exploiting the information
provided by a special survey conducted by the Bank of Italy in 2009, we
find that about 35% of surveyed banks (representing about 36% of total
aggregate credit) increased the relative weight given to qualitative infor-
mation and direct knowledge of the borrower in the lending decision, as a
result of the financial crisis.
The empirical analysis reveals that both family and non-family firms, one
year after the failure of Lehman Brothers, experienced a decline in the ag-
gregate growth rate of loans. However, the contraction was statistically
significantly lower for family firms by around 5 percentage points. This
result is robust to the inclusion of a rich set of observable characteristics
aimed at excluding the correlation of family-ownership with other firm
characteristics. By exploiting the presence of multiple lending relation-
ships, we also control for time varying bank fixed effects. We show that
this differential effect is not driven by the controlling shareholder’s na-
tionality, nor by firms’ group affiliation, nor by different concentrations of
share ownership. We find no differences between family and non-family
firms in the interest rates on their loans and in the amount of physical
collateral provided by the companies (these two results are shown in sec-
tion 1.7 - Appendix). The economic interpretation of these findings is that
the existence of a family block-holder in the firm reduced the expected
risk of default borne by banks, all other things being equal. Given that
family firms are, on average, of smaller size, this alternative flight to qual-
ity mechanism towards family firms is consistent with recent findings by
Presbitero et al. (2012) who show that, in Italy, in the 2007-2009 financial
crisis, smaller firms experienced lower contractions in loan availability rel-
ative to larger ones.
By exploiting the information on bank lending practices provided by the
7
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special survey by the Bank of Italy (previously mentioned), we also show
that the banks that increased the role of soft information accounted for the
observed difference between family and non-family firms. Starting from
this finding, we estimate a time varying firm fixed-effect model in which
a family firm dummy interacts with an identifier of those banks that in-
creased the use of personal information in their lending practices. This
empirical strategy enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity be-
tween firms (e.g. demand shocks) and validate the hypothesis that results
are driven by changes in credit supply. The results suggest that banks, con-
ditional on having increased the relative weight given to soft information,
re-allocated credit towards family firms.
The relevance of our results is twofold. Firstly, family firms are widespread
all around the world, among SMEs and also among big listed companies4
(Bertrand and Schoar (2006)). Therefore, their ability to access financial
markets has a potentially significant impact on the real economy, as fi-
nancially constrained firms tend to reduce investments and employment
levels (Campello et al. (2010)), exacerbating the negative effects of a credit
supply shock5. Accordingly, in the last section of the paper, we show to
what extent the different access to bank lending has been mirrored by dif-
ferences in real outcomes in the 2007-2009 period. We do not find signifi-
cant differences in terms of capital expenditure, while we do find that the
employment policies of family and non-family firms were substantially
heterogeneous. In particular, the reduction in the total workforce was 2.6
percentage points lower for family firms. Finally, we find evidence that
profitability, as measured by the ROE, declined less in family firms. Taken
together, these results suggest that the credit re-allocation towards family
firms has had significant effects for the real economy and appears to have
been ex-post efficient from the perspective of the banking system.
4In our representative sample of Italian firms, family firms represent about 60% of the
total population and about 40% of total sales in 2008.
5See also Kahle and Stulz (2013) for a review of the empirical literature on the effects
of the recent financial crisis.
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A second contribution relates to the debate in the banking literature about
the efficiency of relationship lending. In the last two decades, hard infor-
mation has had an increasingly important role in lending practices due
both to regulatory pressure and to the diffusion of information technolo-
gies in the financial sector. However, this paper shows that soft informa-
tion can mitigate the negative effects of an aggregate credit contraction,
being a valuable resource for banks in times of increased uncertainty.
The rest of the paper is organized as follow: section 1.2 presents the data
used for the analysis and provides some descriptive statistics of the sam-
ple of firms under investigation; section 1.3 analyzes the trends in aggre-
gate granted loans, showing how they differ depending on firm corporate
structure; section 1.4 looks at bank-firm relationship, focusing on the inter-
action between bank lending technologies and family firm status; section
1.5 documents the ex-post differences in real outcomes between family
and non-family firms; section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data sources and descriptive statistics
In this paper we exploit information about bank-firm relationships, firm
corporate governance, firm balance-sheet data and bank organization. Ac-
cordingly, our dataset comes from four main databases: Invind, Cerved,
Centrale dei Rischi (CR) and a special survey on the Italian banks, that
was run by the Bank of Italy in 2009. Each observation is therefore a firm-
quarter-bank triplet, for the years 2007-2009.
The Invind survey is conducted yearly by the Bank of Italy (Bank of Italy
(2011)), on a representative sample of Italian non-financial companies with
more than 20 employees6. It collected information on the variables con-
6This cut-off is set by the Bank of Italy in order to collect information for a repre-
sentative sample of firms belonging to the industrial and service sectors: firms above this
threshold represent 70.5 and 59.2 % of the total payroll employment in the industrial and
non-financial service sectors respectively.
9
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cerning the family status of the firms for three consecutive waves in the
years 2007-20097. The family firm status is attributed on the basis of the
following question:
“Is the firm controlled (directly or indirectly) by a single individual or a group of
persons linked by family relationships?”8
This approach to the definition of family firms relies on self-reported infor-
mation and can overcome the typical identification problem in which the
stake of each shareholder must be measured in order to determine who
controls the firm (see Ellul et al. (2010)). Additionally, for a sub-sample of
observations (industrial firms with at least 50 employees) we are also able
to assess the stakes of controlling shareholders quantitatively. In order to
recover balance-sheet data (total assets, leverage, and ROE among others),
we used the local Italian Chambers of Commerce’s official information col-
lected in the CERVED archives.
We match our firm-level information with the Centrale dei Rischi (CR)
database, containing observations on all loans granted by the Italian bank-
ing system to firms, with quarterly frequency. These data enable us to con-
struct unique variables based on each bank-firm relationship, with quar-
terly frequency. In the empirical analysis, we focus on revocable credit
lines. This choice is due to the homogeneity underlying this type of con-
tract and because this form of credit can be renegotiated unilaterally by
banks.9 Thus, the loans under scrutiny exclude long-term, collateralized
7When the information for a firm was not available in all the waves of the survey,
we check the information from previous years, using Amadeus and on-line search from
the company’s websites. Amadeus is a European database that provides qualitative and
quantitative information on firm ownership structure.
8Translated from Italian.
9The CR database distinguishes between call loans and term loans. When call loans are
granted, banks can call them unilaterally at any moment in time, while with term loans
the bank typically has to wait until the end of term before renegotiation occurs. Thus,
when using the term “revocable credit lines”, we are implicitly referring to call loans only,
10
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loans. As argued by Sapienza (2004), borrowers may have contemporane-
ous relations (deposits, personal loans) with their bank that could affect
the lending decision and for which we can’t control by using the credit
lines10.
Finally, we integrated the above firm-year-bank observations with the in-
formation provided by a special survey conducted by the Bank of Italy’s
regional branches in 2009 on about 400 banks, accounting for 80% of out-
standing bank credit to Italian firms. This survey contains a variable re-
ferred to the relative change in the use of soft information in the lending
decision as a result of the financial crisis. In particular, banks were asked
the following question:
“Starting from October 2008, as a result of the economic and financial crisis,
indicate whether the importance accorded to qualitative information and direct
knowledge of the borrower increased, decreased or remained the same “ 11
After removing state-owned companies and those firms for which we were
unable to recover the structure of the corporate ownership, we were left
with 1,808 family firms and 1,101 non-family firms. Panel A of table 1.1
provides a summary description of the characteristics of our sample, with
family and non-family firms presented separately. We notice that fam-
ily firms were much smaller on average at the end of 2008 (a result well
known in the literature), slightly older and had a lower penetration in the
North of Italy (and conversely a higher penetration in the South) com-
pared to non-family firms. Moreover, family firms were more indebted on
because lines of credit within the term loans group are not considered. However, in order
to be sure that results are not driven by the specific nature of the financial instrument
considered, we also re-estimated all of the empirical models with the call and term loan
data summed together. Results are qualitatively the same, and statistically significant
10Unfortunately, this information is never observable, and all the results must be inter-
preted under this caveat.
11Translated from Italian.
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average prior to the crisis, suffered slightly more from the contraction in
sales relative to non-family firms 12 and generated less cash-flow for each
euro earned (the last two differences are weakly significant). Family and
non-family firms, on the contrary, did not differ significantly in terms of
profitability as measured by the ROE.
Panel B of table 1.1 provides summary statistics regarding firm-bank rela-
tionships. We notice that family and non-family firms had similar risk pro-
files, as measured by the Altman Z-score13 (the difference in rating is sta-
tistically significant but economically negligible). In line with other works
using Italian data (Detragiache et al. (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000)),
multiple lending is a common phenomenon within our sample, with more
than 87% of firms having relations with at least three different banks. Fam-
ily firms have a higher average number of relationships with banks than
non-family firms, a result which is in line with with recent findings by
Guiso and Minetti (2010)14. This finding explains a different degree of
loan concentration for family firms, as measured by the Herfindal index
and also by the relative share of each bank financing the firms’ activity (in
particular the first bank).
Insert Table 1.1 here
12The difference in sales contraction between family and non-family firms is not sta-
tistically significant once we control for sector, size, year of foundation and geographical
area.
13This index is built on balance-sheet figures and can take integer values between 1 and
9. Higher values imply a higher probability of default.
14The authors use concentrated ownership as a proxy for the degree of informational
opacity and the debt restructuring costs for banks in case of corporate reorganization.
With both types of interpretation, ownership concentration predicts a positive probability
of engaging in multiple lending.
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1.3 Bank lending and corporate ownership
In this section we establish whether the degree to which firms suffered
a contraction in bank lending was affected by their corporate ownership
structure. In order to address this empirical question, we first look at the
overall exposure of the firms to the banking sector, in terms of the total
amount of credit lines they have been granted. In particular, we aggregate
data from each firm’s banking relationships into a single observation.
1.3.1 Graphical inspection
Figure 1.1 examines the bank lending channel non parametrically by plot-
ting the dynamics of average granted loans for FF and NFFs separately.
Specifically, we take the mean of the logarithm of the outstanding loans
granted to family and non-family firms in each quarter, from September
2007 up to September 200915, and we normalize to zero the observations,
using the end of the third quarter of 2008 as a base. The y-axis can then be
interpreted as the growth rate of outstanding loans relative to that quarter.
The figure confirms that the choice of Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy for
the identifying date of the credit shock in Italy is reasonable, as the aver-
age growth rates in outstanding loans started to decline during the third
quarter 2008. Moreover, the figure shows that, before and immediately af-
ter the sudden drop occurred in October 2008, there was no significant dif-
ference in the dynamics of loans granted between family and non-family
firms. An important divergence between the two types of firms began
after the first quarter of 2009.
15In each quarter we excluded the first and last percentile of the distribution of the
relative change in the logarithm of loans, in order to control for extreme observations.
13
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Figure 1.1: Bank lending before and after the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy:
overall adjustments
1.3.2 Econometric analysis
In this subsection we test whether the different patterns observed in fig-
ure 1.1 can be rationalized by differences in ex-ante characteristics between
family and non-family firms. Given the nature of the exogenous shock we
are analyzing in this paper, we estimate the following model:
4tlogLoansi = α + β0Familyi + β1Xi + i (1.1)
where subscript i refers to the firm, and Xi is a vector of controls. The
set of control variables captures possible channels which have been iden-
tified in the literature as determinants of bank lending behavior, and that
could be correlated with the family-firm status. Given that family firms
are, on average, smaller than non-family ones, we include the firm size
(expressed by the log of the number of employees) at the end of 2008, as
this characteristic may explain a difference in access to the credit market.
We also control for the geographical area of the firm’s headquarters by us-
ing three geographical dummies, corresponding to the North, the Center
and the South of Italy. This is justified by the uneven geographical diffu-
14
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sion of family and non-family firms: a factor that could result in different
demand shocks, and in different conditions for the access to credit, due to
differences in the distances between firms’ headquarters and their financ-
ing banks.
We also include the share of credit granted by the first bank (evaluated
at the third quarter of 2008), as it can potentially affect the capability of
a company to substitute across banks and, consequently, to hedge bank-
specific shocks. For each firm, we construct the weighted average length of
the relationship with its financing banks (up until October 2008), weighted
by the share of each banking relationship in total borrowing. In such a
way, we control for the average intensity of the bank-firm relationships,
which may not be fully captured by the share of credit granted by the first
bank. Firm’s year of foundation, sector of activity, level of total leverage,
cash-flow over sales, risk (captured by the Z-score being greater than 5) are
also included as natural controls. Finally, we include the change in sales
that occurred between 2008 and 2009 to control for any different change in
the demand for loans resulting from differences in the impact of the crisis
on family and non-family firms.
Our dependent variable is the log difference of average granted loans be-
tween two time windows: the 1st of October 2007 - 30th of September 2008
and the 1st of October 2008 - 30th of September 2009. Within the ’pre-crisis’
and a ’post-crisis’ windows, we summed up each firm’s loans. The two
time windows have the same length in order to avoid problems of season-
ality, as loan applications may vary during the year for economic and fiscal
reasons. We have selected the last quarter of 2008 as the beginning of the
post-crisis period both because Lehman Brothers’ default occurred at the
very end of the third quarter of 2008, and because by doing so we avoid an
arbitrary choice of the time windows to compare. An observation period
immediately “after the Lehman Brothers event” helps us capture mostly
supply-side effects in the dynamics of granted loans, since credit lines re-
spond rapidly to a change in bank portfolio composition. Our results are
15
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derived after excluding the top and the bottom percentiles of the distri-
bution of the dependent variable, in order to control for outliers and to
increase the accuracy of the estimations. Summary statistics of the change
in log of loans are reported in the first line of table 1.2
Insert Table 1.2 here
Column (1) estimates the basic model without controls; column (2) in-
cludes the basic set of controls; column (3) adds the share of the first bank
as a bank-firm characteristic; column (4) looks at the sample of small and
medium-sized firms (SMEs) only16. Results are shown in table 1.3.
Insert Table 1.3 here
Table 1.3 shows that family firms experienced a 5 percentage points lower
decline in the growth rate of loans than non-family firms. The coefficient
is robust to different specifications of the model, and is both highly sta-
tistically significant and economically relevant. We notice that the β0 es-
timates in column (1), without controls, and column (3), with the com-
plete set of controls, are close. This confirms that the observed differences
in the amount of granted loans for family and non-family firms cannot
be fully explained by standard mechanisms and require further investiga-
tion. Moreover, our results are not driven by the change in granted loans
for very large firms (where the comparability between family and non-
family firms is lower, as shown in Table 1.1): the coefficient of β0 is almost
unchanged in column (4), where the sample is restricted to SMEs only.
A higher risk (measured by the Z-score) is associated with a lower amount
of granted loans, as theory predicts. Moreover, the growth of loans is
lower when borrowing is more concentrated in the first bank. The neg-
ative sign of this coefficient, as previously discussed, may be explained
16SMEs are defined as having no more than 250 employees and 50 millions euro of
annual sales. This definition is commonly used not only in Italy but also in the rest of the
European Union.
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by the fact the higher concentration of borrowing in the first bank neg-
atively affects the firm’s ability to hedge bank specific shocks. It is also
consistent with the empirical evidence that the first financial institution
more frequently belongs to the major five Italian banking groups, which
cut their credit, on average, more than the other banks (see Albertazzi and
Marchetti (2010)).
We argue that the estimated difference between family and non-family
firms is mostly driven by a change in the supply of credit. It is true that
the change in outstanding loans derived from the financial crisis cannot
be directly interpreted as the effect of a credit supply contraction, but the
coefficient β0 of the regression model captures any additional difference on
top of that observed for non-family firms. Therefore, we could interpret
the difference between family and non-family firms as a supply-driven
effect, assuming that the rich set of observable characteristics included in
the analysis captures firms’ demand for credit17.
1.3.3 Robustness checks
We have documented so far the existence of divergent patterns in the ag-
gregate dynamics of credit for family and non-family firms. We have
also controlled for a set of observable characteristics, potentially correlated
with the existence of a family block-holder, able to influence the dynamics
of credit. However, some concerns must still be addressed.
Foreign firms
The first relates to the foreign status of the firm. In fact, the large majority
of foreign firms (they account for around 8% of our sample) are controlled
by non-family block-holders and could follow patterns of credit different
17The following results are robust to i) the inclusion of the interaction term between the
family firm dummy and the change in sales; ii) the inclusion of the square of log size; iii)
measuring size in terms of total assets, instead of number of employees.
17
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from those observed for Italian companies. Foreign firms may in principle
substitute domestic credit with foreign credit by exploiting their multina-
tional group affiliation, or may be systematically discriminated against by
local banks. In order to be sure that our results are not driven by a dif-
ference in the nationalities of the companies, column (1) of table 1.4 adds
a dummy for the firm’s foreign status to the full specification in column
(3) in table 1.3. Reassuringly, our family dummy is still statistically signif-
icant, even if the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly lower than before
(the foreign status is negatively correlated with the change in loans, but
the difference is not significant).
Insert Table 1.4 here
Group affiliation
A second concern, partially related to the first one, arises because of the
possibility that firms could substitute bank credit with intra-group financ-
ing transactions. If group affiliation is negatively correlated with family
firms status, then our results could be explained by a lower demand for
bank loans by non-family firms. In order to control for that, column (2) of
table 1.4 adds to the full specification of column (3) in table 1.3 a dummy to
distinguish group-affiliated and independent firms. Again, our previous
results are robust to this additional control and the group dummy has the
expected negative sign, which is also statistically significant.
Ownership concentration
Furthermore, we want to be sure that our results are not driven by a differ-
ence in the ownership concentration of the controlling shareholder, which
has been found to play an adverse effect on the risk of default (see Aslan
and Kumar (2012)) and may vary between family and non-family firms.
The cleanest available information is the fraction of shares held by the first
shareholder; unfortunately this information is only available for relatively
18
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large firms (with 50 employees or more). This reduces the number of ob-
servations by more than half. Column (3) of table 1.4 adds the ownership
concentration of the first shareholder to the full specification in column (3)
in table 1.3. In line with theory, higher degrees of ownership concentration
in the dominant shareholder reduce the amount of loans granted (even if
the coefficient is only weakly significant), but the existence of a family
block-holder (ceteris paribus) significantly reduces this negative effect (the
coefficient associated with family firm status is positive and around 6 per-
centage points).
Lock-in effects
The last hypothesis we want to test is whether the observed difference
between family and non-family firms can be simply explained by ex-ante
matching with different types of financial institutions. In other words, be-
cause it is costly to switch banks, and the switching costs may be propor-
tional to loans concentration, non-family firms might have been “locked-
in” with those banks that cut down more during the crisis. In order to
address this issue, we need to check whether family and non-family firms
have been treated differently by the same bank. By exploiting informa-
tion at the level of individual bank-firm relationships we can compare the
change in log loans for family and non-family firms, controlling for bank
fixed-effects (thus for time-varying bank fixed effects)18. We estimate the
following model:
4tlogLoansij = α + β0Familyi + γXij + fj + ij (1.2)
where4tlogLoansij is the log difference in the average value of loans granted
(the averaging procedure is identical to the one used before) for firm i, by
bank j. Xij includes not only the firm-specific characteristics used in the
previous analysis, but also the share of loans from bank j to firm i, relative
18Summary statistics of the change in log loans at the individual bank-firm level are
reported in the second line of table 1.2.
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to total loans for firm i and the length of the bank-firm relationship, both
measured at the third quarter of 2008. The addition of these two variables
is important, as they control for very large percentage variations in the de-
pendent variable, induced by loans of a small size. Finally, fj represents
the bank j fixed effect. Results are reported in column (4) and (5) of table
1.4. In column (4), we report the analog of the aggregate results presented
in column (3) of table 1.3 at the individual bank-firm level. Column (5)
adds bank fixed effects.
The estimates of β0 in the specifications with and without bank fixed-
effects are almost identical and very similar to those obtained at the ag-
gregate level. They confirm that divergent trends in the amount of loans
granted for family and non-family firms are not driven by “lock-in” effects
induced by an ex-ante sorting of family firms with particular banks.
1.4 Heterogeneity among banks in lending prac-
tices
In the previous section we observed that, following October 2008, the
credit contraction was significantly lower for family firms, after control-
ling for a rich set of observable characteristics, hence conditioning on hard
information. This finding is consistent with the idea that an additional
piece of information, namely soft information acquired through the per-
sonal interaction of the firms’ managers with loan officers, played a sub-
stantial role in explaining the observed difference19. In particular, it might
have allowed banks to better assess the borrower’s risk, revealing that it
was lower, on average, for family firms.
To test for this hypothesis, we rely on a special survey conducted by the
Bank of Italy in 2009 (see section 1.2), and in particular on a variable re-
ferred to the change in the use of soft information in the lending decision
19Examples of soft information comprise the degree of cohesiveness among firm’s share-
holders, their personal history, or the existence of hidden personal assets.
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after September 2008. We find an increase in the relative importance of soft
information for around 35% of surveyed banks (representing about 36% of
total aggregate credit), while a decrease in less than 5% of the cases. The
increased importance of this type of information following an adverse ag-
gregate shock is consistent with the idea, recently formalized by Bolton
et al. (2013), that soft information collected at the branch level can par-
tially substitute hard information in the assessment of borrower’s risk, as
it is continuosly updated thanks to frequent contacts with the firm. At the
same time, the degree of such change over time in the screening technol-
ogy depends on the existing bank’s organizational structure. In particular,
soft information is costly to collect: in the extreme case of a bank that
only processed hard information before the crisis, a sudden shift to soft
information-based screening technologies would probabily be unfeasible.
Regulatory interventions played a role in shaping the optimal mix of hard
and soft information adopted by banks before the crisis; for instance, the
Basel II reform in 2004 recommended an expansion in the use of standard-
ized criteria for company default risk evaluation in order to increase the
transparency and comparability of national banking sectors. For the Ital-
ian case, Albareto et al. (2008) show that hard-information based practices
have been consequently adopted by almost all larger Italian banks, and by
the majority of all other banks.
Table 1.5 shows that when the sample of banks is split between those that
increased the use of soft information, labeled as “soft-type” banks, and
those that did not, labeled as “non soft-type” banks20, no difference in the
pre-crisis levels of capitalization (measured as the ratio of total equity over
total asset) is observed. Similarly, results reveal that the weighted averages
20It is important to remind that we are measuring changes in the relative importance
of soft information, not absolute levels. Hence, “non soft-type” banks could be those that
were attaching, already before October 2008, a high value to soft information in their
lending decision. However, the estimates of the Z-score variable in table 1.6 suggest that
there is a strong positive association between the relative and the absolute measures of
soft information.
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of the net interest rates and of the length of the bank-firm relationships do
not differ between the two types of banks21.
Finally, and most importantly for our purposes, the last two lines of the
table 1.5 report the pre-crisis share of credit granted to family firms by the
two groups of banks22. In particular, the ex-ante share of credit granted to
family firms is not statistically different both considering revocable loans
only and the overall financial exposure. Family firms have a relatively
high share of total credit granted, both by “soft” and “non-soft” banks,
primarily because they represent about 60% of our sample and are, on av-
erage, more leveraged. This last piece of evidence supports the assump-
tion that the magnitudes of banks’ shocks, which are likely correlated with
the endogenous choice of increasing the importance of soft information in
the screening process, are invariant to the family firm characteristic.
Insert Table 1.5 here
By splitting the sample of surveyed banks between those that increased
the use of soft information and those that did not, we replicate the graphi-
cal analysis of figure 1.1. This is shown in figure 1.2; the dashed line refers
to non-family firms, the other to family firms.
The growth rate of credit appears very different before and after the cri-
sis for the two types of banks. This implies that the decision to change
lending technology is likely correlated with the severity of the shock suf-
fered by those banks. While the credit granted by “non-soft” banks was
already declining in the period preceding October 2008, the growth rate
of credit granted by “soft” banks was increasing until the end of 2008 and
then, at the onset of the recession, started shrinking. In particular, we can
observe that for the latter banks, there was no difference between family
21Weights are equal to the relative share of credit granted to firm i by bank j over the
total amount of credit granted to that firm, in the time window 1st of October 2007 - 30th
of September 2008
22The first of the two lines considers revocable loans only, while the second lines sums
up revocable loans with term loans
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Figure 1.2: Bank lending and heterogeneity in screening technologies
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and non-family firms before the Lehman brothers bankruptcy shock; fol-
lowing October 2008, the difference emerged. For the “non-soft” group, it
seems that a difference between family and non-family firms already ex-
isted before the crisis and that, following the shock, the difference weakly
started to widen.
To test whether the differences in figure 1.2 are statistically significant after
controlling for observed heterogeneities between family and non-family
firms, we can re-estimate equation (1.1), splitting the total amount of loans
granted for each firm into two groups, corresponding to loans from “soft”
and “non-soft” banks. Results are reported in table 1.6.
Insert Table 1.6 here
Results suggest that the difference between family and non-family firms
is statistically significant only for those banks that reported an increase in
the use of soft information, following October 2008. In particular, family
firms experienced a drop in the growth rate of credit that was of about
6 percentage points lower than for non-family firms, ceteris paribus. This
result validates the prior that soft information played a crucial role in ex-
plaining the observed difference in access to bank lending for family firms.
Consistently with the previous discussion, we find that high values of the
Z-score, captured by the risk dummy, negatively (and significantly) affect
the dynamics of credit granted for “non-soft” banks, while it plays no role
in explaining the lending decision of banks that rely more on soft infor-
mation. This last piece of evidence is also in line with Garcia-Appendini
(2011), showing that, for banks that do not have access to soft information,
the propensity to grant a loan is more sensitive to changes in the values of
publicly available variables.
1.4.1 Controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity
The final set of results fully controls for unobserved time-varying hetero-
geneity at the firm level, and in particular for demand-side effects. We ex-
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ploit the existence of multiple lending within our sample and we include
firm fixed-effects in the following regression model:
4tlogLoansij = α+β04tSoftj +β1Familyi4tSoftj + γZij + fi + ij (1.3)
where4tlogLoansij is the change in log loans for firm i from bank j;4tSoftij
is a dummy equal to one if bank j increased the importance attached to soft
information after October 2008; Zij includes the share of loans from bank
j to firm i, relative to total loans for firm i and the length of the bank-firm
relationship, both measured at the end of September 2008 and controls for
loan-specific demand effects that may vary between banks for family and
non-family firms, due to heterogeneity in the banks’ screening processes;
fi is the firm fixed-effect. This estimation strategy is analogous to that
proposed by Khwaja and Mian (2008), as the firm fixed-effect controls for
demand effects that are invariant with respect to bank characteristics.
Our estimate of interest is now represented by the coefficient β1, which
identifies the interaction between the family firm dummy and 4tSoftij .
This parameter captures whether, after controlling for unobservable firm
characteristics, banks’ use of soft information affected the supply of credit
to family and non-family firms. Intuitively, the coefficient β1 measures
whether the difference in the family firm dummies between the two columns
of table 1.6 is supply-driven. Given the evidence in table 1.5, the identi-
fying assumption, similar in spirit to that of Rajan and Zingales (1998), is
that the different lending behavior of the two types of banks to family and
non-family firms is caused by the change in the use of soft information.
Results are shown in table 1.7.
Insert Table 1.7 here
Results in columns (1) and (2) show that, for those banks that increased
the importance attached to soft information, family firms experienced a
relatively smaller credit contraction compared to non family firms. The ef-
fect is statistically significant and economically relevant (the difference is
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around 8 percentage points). Therefore, we can credibly argue that soft in-
formation, by uncovering their higher degree of reliability, helped family
firms mitigate the adverse consequences of the financial crisis.
1.5 Investments, employment and economic
performance
In this last section we analyze the real effects of the financial crisis to
see whether differences arise between family and non-family firms in the
2007-2009 period. As highlighted in the introduction, we relate our results
to the growing literature, that followed the 2008 financial crisis, about the
effects of bank lending shocks to the real economy. Specifically, in table 1.8,
columns (1) to (4), we use as dependent variable the log difference in phys-
ical capital expenditures, in intangible asset investments, in the number of
employees and in the average wage respectively; in column (5), instead,
the dependent variable is the absolute difference in the return on equity
(ROE). We use balance sheet figures at the end of 2007 and of 2009, that is
the year the preceded and the one that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers. We control for the sector of activity, the geographical area where
headquarters are established, the year of foundation, the size and the total
leverage of the firm. Unfortunately, due to missing balance-sheet data on
the dependent variables for some firms, the number of observations is not
constant throughout the analysis.
Insert Table 1.8 here
Results show that while family and non-family firms did not differ sig-
nificantly in terms of investments (both in tangible and intangible assets),
a negative and significant difference emerges in terms of the change in
the number of workers. In particular, the reduction in the number of em-
ployees has been 2.6 percentage points lower for family firms compared
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to non-family ones. This difference is not mirrored by a change in the av-
erage wage, suggesting that the reduction in the employment levels was
homogenous across classes of workers. These results are consistent with
recent findings by Sraer and Thesmar (2007), Bassanini et al. (2013) and
D’Aurizio and Romano (2013), showing that workforce levels in family
firms tend to be less sensitive to negative shocks. Finally, the reduction in
ROE was less severe for family firms by 2 percentage points, and this dif-
ference is statistically significant at conventional levels. These results tend
to corroborate the hypothesis that the credit re-allocation towards family
firms has been ex-post efficient from the banks perspective, rejecting the
alternative explanation of a matching between family owners trying to
tunnel resources out of the company and opportunistic loan officers gain-
ing private benefits at the expense of bank’s shareholders23.
1.6 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the credit allocation decisions of Italian
banks following Lehman Brothers’ failure. We have found that corpo-
rate ownership is an important source of firm heterogeneity. In particular,
the presence of a family block-holder had a positive effect in mitigating
the agency conflict in the borrower-lender relationship. This effect was
strongly related to an increase in the use of soft information by Italian
banks in their lending practices following October 2008. The main result
is robust to different specifications of our empirical model. We have been
able to control for ex-ante observable differences between family and non-
family firms and also to exclude the existence of significant “lock-in” ef-
fects that could potentially reduce the capabilities of firms to hedge bank
specific shocks, thanks to the highly detailed data available on bank-firm
relations. Finally we controlled for unobserved heterogeneity, confirming
23We also checked that the ex-post ratio of delinquent loans over total granted loans and
the default rate between family firms and non-family firms were not significantly different.
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that the credit allocation was driven by a change in the credit supply. At
the same time, this difference in credit availability was not mirrored by a
contenporaneus difference in capital investments, while it was associated
with a lower contraction in the total workforce for family firms.
Our results indicate that it is crucial to look at heterogeneity on both sides
of the borrower-lender relationship when studying the propagation of ad-
verse shocks through bank lending. Moreover, our paper, in line with
other recent contributions in the literature, highlights the importance of
soft information during crises in mitigating the negative effects of a credit
crunch.
Finally, notice that our results are not inconsistent with the standard flight-
to-quality of credit from smaller (and relatively more opaque) firms to
larger (and relatively more transparent) ones as a result of negative shocks
hitting the banking sector. We complement the existing evidence (includ-
ing the recent contribution by Iyer et al. (2014)) showing that, within the
same firm size class, there is a difference in the dynamics of credit sup-
ply depending on the corporate ownership structure. Nonetheless, our
analysis primarily concerns the effects of an uncertainty shock hitting the
Italian banking sector at the end of 2008 that did not involve also a neg-
ative liquidity shock (except for some larger banks). Therefore, a natural
extension of our analysis is to explore whether the different lending be-
havior to family and non-family firms is observed also in times when the
financial stability of the banking sector gets weakened. In this case, the
demand by financial markets and regulators for more transparency into
the banks’ operating performances may induce a higher reliance on hard
information in the screening process, lowering the relative advantage of
family firms in accessing bank lending in times of crisis.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Data construction
The CR database records all the loans granted by Italian banks that exceed
a minimum threshold. The threshold is determined by summing up all
the types of loans granted to an individual firm by a bank into three main
categories:
1. short-term lines of credit (analyzed in this paper),
2. collateralized credit lines, mortgages, etc.,
3. advances, etc.
The threshold changed over time: it was 75,000 euros up to September
2008 and then reduced to 30,000 euros. For missing observations we pro-
ceed as follows:
• when an observation for a specific line of credit at the bank-firm level
is missing in some of the quarters between 1st October 2007 and 30
September 2009, we consider the total value of loans issued by the
individual bank,
• if the total amount of loans is above the threshold, we assign zero to
that observation,
• if the total amount of loans is below the threshold, we compute its ex-
pected value (37,500 before October 2008 and 15,000 afterwards) and
divide it by three (the number of components in the total amount)
and assign the resulting value to the observation.
The inclusion of zeros poses a problem when we estimate the log difference
in loans granted at the individual bank-firm level. We therefore exclude
these observations from the sample, instead of arbitrarily changing their
values to a positive integer. However, the occurrence of these observations
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is limited both in terms of their number and their economic relevance, as
table 1.9 clearly shows.
Insert Table 1.9 here
1.7.2 Collateral channel
The observed differences in the change of credit granted to family and
non-family firms could also be the result of the different abilities of these
two types of firms to provide hard and verifiable collateral to banks. Al-
though our analysis is conducted on call loans only (not directly affected
by the ability of firms to provide collateral assets), some degree of sub-
stitutability with collateralized term loans could exist. To overcome this
type of concern, we confirmed our findings by re-estimating the empirical
models in the paper, using the sum of call and term loans as dependent
variable. As already outlined in section 1.2, the estimates were qualita-
tively similar and statistically significant. An alternative hypothesis is that
a certain degree of complementarity could exist between call loans and col-
lateralized term loans. In particular, a bank may be more willing to grant
call loans to firms that have already pledged collateral on their term loans.
Given that we cannot insert the change in collateral for each firm as regres-
sor in the analysis due to endogeneity issues, we address this concern by
estimating a model where the dependent variable is the log difference of
the average amount of collateral pledged for each firm between two time
windows: the 1st of October 2007 - 30th of September 2008 and the 1st of
October 2008 - 30th of September 2009. Results from table 1.10, columns
(1) and (2), clearly show that the family firm dummy has no explanatory
power on the change in the dependent variable. This finding reassures us
that the results outlined in the paper are not driven by systematic differ-
ences between family and non-family firms in the elasticity of collateral
provision.
Insert Table 1.10 here
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1.7.3 Interest rate
In table 1.10, columns (3) and (4), we analyze the cost of borrowing, to
check whether differences in the change in the (net) interest rate charged
to family and non-family firms exist. In order to do so, we exploit the
information contained in a special survey conducted by the Bank of Italy
on a subsample of Italian banks (about 200). Unfortunately, this comes at
the cost of reducing significantly the number of observations we can in-
clude in our estimation. In the regression analysis, the dependent variable
is the difference of average interest rates charged on outstanding loans
between two time windows: the 1st of October 2007 - 30th of September
2008 and the 1st of October 2008 - 30th of September 2009. Interest rates are
weighted by the relative amount of granted credit for each bank-firm rela-
tionship. Results show that interest rates went down in the period under
consideration (as a result of ECB interventions in the interbank market),
but no differences emerged between family and non-family firms.
1.7.4 Other financing channels
Given that family and non-family firms differ on average in terms of size,
it is possible that the biggest firms may finance their activities by directly
accessing the capital market through equity or bond issuance. Therefore,
despite we already control for size in our analysis, for the sake of com-
pleteness, we re-estimate the main model, excluding firms that in the pe-
riod 2008-2009 proceeded with equity or bond issuances/payouts. This is
the most precise information that we can obtain from the dataset Invind
regarding all the firms in the sample. We find that 16% of the firms in our
sample changed at least 0.1% of their capital financing structure; in partic-
ular the percentage of family firms is 14.5% while for non-family firms it is
20%. By re-estimating equation 1.1 and by excluding those firms that ac-
cessed the capital market directly, we find that our findings are still robust;
the significance and the magnitude of the family dummy is always strong
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for all the specification of the model. This finding further reassures us that
the size of the firms is not the main driving force behind our findings.
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1.8 Tables
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics for family and non-family firms, prior to the shock
Non-Family Family Mean Diff.
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median Obs.
Panel A:Firm characteristics:
Foundation 1976.88 22.79 1981.00 1973.88 24.20 1979.00 3.00*** 2909
Employees (2008) 421.63 1324.20 100.00 170.06 422.20 60.00 251.60*** 2909
SMEs (%) .63 .48 1 .78 .41 1 -0.15*** 2909
North (%) .46 .50 0 .39 .49 0 0.07*** 2909
Center (%) .24 .43 0 .22 .41 0 0.02 2909
South (%) .31 .46 0 .40 .49 0 -0.09*** 2909
Roe (2007)a (%) 6.25 6.97 4.9 6.40 6.13 5.26 -0.15 2741
Leverage (2007)a (%) .44 .49 .31 .51 .51 .40 -0.07*** 2200
Cashflow/Revenues (2008) .06 .12 .05 .04 .42 .05 0.02* 2781
Change in sales2008−09 (%) -.14 .29 -.09 -.16 .27 -.12 0.02* 2909
Panel b:Bank-Firm relation:
Zscore (2008) 4.50 1.82 4 4.30 1.76 4 0.20*** 2641
Bank Leverage (2007)§ (%) .39 .46 .27 .44 .42 .35 -0.05** 1710
N◦ bank relations 6.64 5.01 5.00 7.60 5.03 6.00 -0.96*** 2848
Share first bank (%) .56 .24 .51 .48 .21 .44 0.08*** 2909
Share second bank (%) .22 .11 .21 .22 .09 .22 -0.00 2763
Share third bank (%) .12 .07 .12 .13 .06 .13 -0.01*** 2535
Share fourth bank (%) .08 .05 .08 .09 .05 .09 .01*** 2253
Herfindal index .45 .21 .30 .36 .23 .32 0.09*** 2909
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. SMEs are defined as having 250 employees or less and
annual sales less than 50 millions euro. Rating takes values between 1 and 9, increasing in the borrower’s risk. a extreme values were
recoded at the 1th e 99th percentiles because of outliers in these variables. Leverage is measured as total debt over total assets in
2007; ROE is calculated as net profit over total equity in 2007. N◦ of bank relations and Herfindal index (measured in terms of loans
concentration at the firm level) measured at the end of September 2008.
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of the change in log lending
log(loans)09-log(loans)08: Mean St. Dev. Median Observations
aggregated at the firm level -.08 .42 -.03 2851
at the bank-firm level -.15 1.01 0 15212
log(loans)09-log(loans)08 is the log difference of the average granted loans in the time
windows 1st October 2007 - 30th September 2008 and 1 October 2008 - 30 September
2009. When aggregated at the firm level, it implies that in each quarter all bank loans
for each firm are summed, and then the ex-ante and ex-post averages computed. When
considered at the bank-firm level, it implies that, for each loan from a single bank to
a single firm, the ex-ante and ex-post averages are computed. At the aggregate level,
we cut the distribution at the 1th e 99th percentiles of the distribution to control for
outliers. At the bank-firm level we consider only those observations relative to firms
analyzed at the aggregate level.
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Table 1.3: Granted loans and corporate structure
Dependent variable: ∆tlogLoansi
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family 0.0577∗∗∗ 0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0481∗∗ 0.0514∗∗
(0.0168) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0234)
log(Size) -0.0206∗∗ -0.0203∗∗ -0.0196
(0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0174)
Risk -0.0416∗∗ -0.0543∗∗∗ -0.0323
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0203)
Leverage 0.0110 0.0132 0.0005
(0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0016)
% Change in sales2008−09 0.0584 0.0643 0.0694
(0.0449) (0.0450) (0.0513)
Year of foundation 0.0001 0.0001 0.0009∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Share first -0.2585∗∗∗ 0.2119∗∗∗
(0.0483) (0.0549)
Constant -0.1180∗∗∗ -0.2190 -0.1568 -1.7296
(0.0139) (0.8890) (0.8770) (0.9545)
Other controls No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2851 2026 2026 1473
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Leverage
is measured at the end of 2007. Share first measured at the end of Sep. 2008. Other
variables are measured at Dec. 2008. Other controls include 11 sector dummies, 3
geographical dummies, cash-flow over revenues and weighted length of the relations.
SMEs are defined as having 250 employees or less and annual sales less than 50 millions
euro. For all the specifications we cut the 1th e 99th percentiles of the dependent
variable to control for outliers.
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Table 1.4: Robustness checks
Dependent variable ∆tlogLoansi ∆tlogLoansij
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Family 0.0447∗∗ 0.0451∗∗ 0.0578∗ 0.0416∗∗ 0.0446∗∗∗
(0.0201) (0.0204) (0.0340) (0.0197) (0.0164)
Foreign -0.0338
(0.0569)
Group affiliation -0.0451∗∗
(0.0211)
Concentration -0.0009∗
(0.0005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank fixed-effects No No No No Yes
Observations 2026 2009 911 15212 15212
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For columns (1) and 3: Robust standard errors in
parentheses. Controls are those included in column (3) of table 2.3. We cut the 1◦ and
99◦ percentile of the dependent variable to control for outliers. For columns (4) and (5):
controls are those included in column (3) in table table 2.3, plus the share of loans from
bank j to firm i, relative to total loans for firm i, and the length of the bank-firm relation,
both measured at the end of September 2008. In column (4) we compute robust standard
errors clustered at the firm level, while in column (5) clusters are derived at the bank
level.
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Table 1.5: Summary Statistics for Non-Soft and Soft banks
Non-Soft Soft Difference
Mean Obs. Mean Obs.
Pre-crisis capital ratio .126 210 .120 117 .006
[.062] [.0.05]
Pre-crisis weighted average length of the bank-firm 7.353 213 6.852 119 .501
relationship (measured in years) (3.334) (3.720)
Pre-crisis weighted average net interest rate (%) 2.882 213 3.127 119 -.245
(4.836) (4.458)
Pre-crisis share of granted credit to family firms (1) .614 213 .649 119 -.035
(.352) (.326)
Pre-crisis share of granted credit to family firms (2) .606 213 .626 119 .020
(.345) (.316)
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Granted credit amounts are labeled with (1) or (2). (1) refers only to revocable
loans. (2) refers to the sum of revocable loans plus term loans. Pre-crisis period refers to average values in the time
window: 1st of October 2007 - 30th of September 2008. Capital ratio is defined as total equity over total assets for
each banks; it is measured at the second quarter of 2008. % of big banks is the share of big banks as defined by
the bank of Italy. Weighted average length of credit relation is measured as the number of years of each bank-firm
relationship at October 2008. Weights are equal to the relative share of credit granted to firm i by bank j, over
the total amount of loans granted to that firm, in the time window 1st of October 2007 - 30th of September 2008.
Weighted average net interest rate is the average interest rate in the time window 1st of October 2007 - 30th of
September 2008 for each bank-firm relationship which it is observable; weights are constructed as explained above.
Standard deviations in square brackets.
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Table 1.6: Estimation results: Soft information and family firms
Dependent variable: ∆tlogLoansi
“Non-Soft”-type banks “Soft”-type banks
(1) (2)
Family 0.0046 0.0731**
(0.0343) (0.0344)
log(Size) -0.0679*** -0.0072
(0.0149) (0.0156)
Risk -0.0804*** -0.0088
(0.0295) (0.0293)
Leverage -0.0003 -0.0122*
(0.0050) (0.0069)
% Change in sales2008−09 0.1078* -0.0597
(0.0646) (0.0719)
Year of foundation -0.0004 -0.0003
(0.0006) (0.0009)
Share first -0.2925*** 0.0318
(0.0810) (0.0920)
Constant 1.1092 0.6528
(1.2401) (1.7806)
Other controls Yes Yes
Observations 1970 1827
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Length of the relation and Share of the bank measured at the
end of Sep. 2008. Other controls include 11 sector dummies, 3 geographical dummies,
cash-flow over revenues and weighted length of the relations.
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Table 1.7: Banks’ heterogeneity in the screening process
Dependent variable: ∆tlogLoansij
(1) (2)
∆tSoft 0.0995
∗∗∗ 0.0642∗
(0.0353) (.0352)
∆tSoft x Family 0.0797
∗ 0.0845∗∗
(.0424) (0.0420)
Share of the bank -1.0583∗∗∗
(0.0773)
Length of the relation -0.0094∗∗∗
(0.0030)
Constant -0.1804∗∗∗ -0.0530∗∗
(0.0082) (0.0240)
Firm fixed-effects Yes Yes
Observations 12864 12864
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the firm level.∗ p <
0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Length of the relation and Share of the
bank measured at the end of Sep. 2008.
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Table 1.8: Estimation results: Real outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: ∆tlogTang.Invi ∆tlogIntang.Invi ∆tlogEmploym.i ∆tlogWagei ∆tROEi
Family -0.0690 -0.0364 0.0259∗∗∗ 0.0128 2.028∗
(0.0830) (0.108) (0.00998) (0.0134) (1.113)
log(Size) -0.0837 -0.363∗ 0.0955∗∗∗ 0.0149 -1.114
(0.178) (0.217) (0.0213) (0.0367) (2.720)
Leverage -0.0995 -0.0413 0.00376 -0.00184 0.381
(0.0889) (0.0777) (0.00773) (0.0114) (0.950)
Year of foundation -0.00181 -0.000439 0.000414∗∗∗ 0.000227 0.0126
(0.00158) (0.00206) (0.000158) (0.000249) (0.0248)
Constant 3.999 1.966 -1.116∗∗∗ -0.436 -25.17
(3.253) (4.242) (0.313) (0.499) (49.32)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1801 1046 2037 1395 1833
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Other controls include 11 sector dummies, 3
geographical dummies, and the square of log(size).
Table 1.9: Appendix - Comparative statistics for the bank-firm loan observations
(euro)
Mean Median Obs.
Before October 2008:
Bank-firm relations disappeared after Sept. 2008 247,692 11,267 458
Bank-firm relations considered in the analysis 710,715 100,000 19,722
After October 2008:
New bank-firm relations appeared after Sept. 2008 178,746 6,250 438
Bank-firm relations considered in the analysis 672,147.8 100,000 19,722
Table refers to bank-firm loan averages either for the period 1st October 2007 - 30th September
2008 (Before October 2008) or for the period 1st October 2008 - 30th September 2009 (After
October 2008)
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Table 1.10: Appendix - Collateral channel, Interest rates
Dependent variable: ∆tCollat.ratioi ∆tNetinterestratei
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Family -0.0359 -0.0822 0.0019 -0.0023
(0.0636) (0.0727) (0.0080) (0.0087)
log(Size) -0.0124 -0.0098∗
(0.0235) (0.0056)
Risk -0.0670 0.0051
(0.0625) (0.0108)
Leverage 0.136 -0.00917∗
(0.0827) (0.00514)
Cashflow/Revenues 0.0148 -0.0013
(0.0297) (0.0010)
% Change in sales2008−09 -0.0665 -0.0132
(0.0881) (0.0119)
Share first -1.028∗ -0.0440
(0.571) (0.0764)
Constant 0.154∗∗∗ -2.700 -0.0291∗∗∗ -0.4100
(0.0524) (1.865) (0.0067) (0.4550)
Other controls No Yes No Yes
Observations 1182 841 998 863
Robust standard errors in parentheses.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Leverage
is measured at the end of 2007. Share first measured at the end of Sep. 2008. Other
variables are measured at Dec. 2008. Other controls include 11 sector dummies, 3
geographical dummies, firm’s year of foundation and weighted length of the relations.
For columns (1) and (2) we cut the 1th e 99th percentiles of the dependent variable
to control for outliers.
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Chapter 2
Financial Intermediation,
House Prices, and the Welfare
Effects of the U.S. Great
Recession
with Dominik Menno (RWTH Aachen University)
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2.1 Introduction
The U.S. Great Recession was characterized by a large fall in GDP coupled
with an unprecedented collapse in the housing market. This drop in ag-
gregate house price between 2007:IV and 2009:II deeply affected a great
number of U.S. households. 1 Figure 2.1 shows the de-trended quarterly
series of US GDP and aggregate house prices. We observe a large drop of
around 5.4% between the NBER recession dates, and a collapse in aggre-
gate house prices of about 11%.
Figure 2.1: GDP growth vs. house price growth
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Notes: Shaded areas are NBER recession dates. The grey dotted-line is the Y2Y-growth rate of All-
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The recession has also been linked turbulence in the financial markets and,
in particular, the banking system. This fact has triggered a debate among
economists and policy-makers about the welfare consequences of the fi-
1Iacoviello (2011b) shows that housing wealth represents about half of total household
net worth in 2008 and almost two third of median household total wealth
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nancial innovation process that preceded the crisis and that possibly ex-
acerbated the effects of the economic collapse. In fact, the last decade
witnessed an increase in household indebtedness that coincided with a
period of relaxing credit conditions. Both microeconomic and macroe-
conomic evidence show an increase in household leverage in the years
preceding the recession. On the micro side, an analysis of Survey of Con-
sumer Finance (SCF) data reveals that aggregate mortgage debt expanded
by 59% between 2001 and 2007, despite a 19% increase in housing wealth.
On the macro side, we observe around ten quarters of growth in lever-
age followed by sharp fall during the NBER recession dates, as seen in the
mortgage to real estate ratio. Figure 2.2 plots the year-to-year growth rate
of leverage and the spread between the mortgage interest rate and the fed-
eral funds rate. These two series show a negative correlation at the onset,
and in the last quarters of the Great Recession. During the quarters pre-
ceding the crisis, spreads were particularly low and leverage was rising at
an unprecedented rate. In mid-2008 however, interest rate spreads jumped
to a level of about 4.5% while household leverage started to decline. Our
interpretation is that, in the period of credit expansion (low spreads), the
mortgage growth rate was faster than real estate inflation and leverage
was increasing; the opposite happened in a period of credit contraction
(high spreads).
In the current paper we examine the effects of exogenous changes in in-
terest rate spreads and aggregate income on endogenous aggregate house
prices and, ultimately, on households’ welfare. In this respect, we share
the view that fluctuations in spreads largely reflect disturbances in the fi-
nancial markets’ assessments of credit risk Bordo (2008). Furthermore, we
share the view of Adrian and Shin (2010) that variations in the price of
default risk reflected variations in the effective risk-bearing capacity of the
financial sector, which has been ultimately affected by aggregate portfolio
losses.
The stylized facts highlighted in figures 2.1 and 2.2 motivate our interest
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Figure 2.2: Mortgage spread vs. Leverage
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in quantifying and isolating the impacts of financial and income shocks on
aggregate house prices and, consequently, on households’ welfare. In par-
ticular we address this question within a stochastic dynamic general equi-
librium model with heterogeneous households and endogenous collateral
constraints. In our model, households differ in their level of patience. This
heterogeneity results into two types of agents: borrowers, who are poten-
tially financial constrained, and savers, who are unconstrained.2 Within
this framework, we study the welfare effects of an endogenous drop in
housing wealth for these two groups of households. The data in table
2.1 motivate the choice of this cross-sectional heterogeneity across house-
2The structure of the economy is similar to Iacoviello (2011a) and Justiniano et al.
(2013) who present a quantitative analysis of the US Great Recession
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics from SCF panel 2007-2009
Household type2007 Savers Borrowers All households
∆07,09housing wealth -9.2% -16.6% -12.9%
Leverage2007 < 43% 43 - 67% >67%
∆07,09housing wealth -12.9% -16.5% -23.5 %
holds. Using panel data from the Survey of Consumer Finance (SCF) for
the period from 2007 to 2009, the table shows that households with a posi-
tive net savings position (savers) show an average drop in housing wealth
of 9.2% between 2007 and 2009. This is significantly lower than the equiv-
alent number for households with a negative net savings position (borrow-
ers, -16.6%).3
Moreover we show that the drop in housing wealth for borrowers is in-
creasing in the level of leverage in 2007:4 while borrowers with initial
levels of leverage greater than or equal to 67% show a drop of 23.5% in
housing wealth, households that entered the recession with a lower level
of leverage (less than 43%) show a much smaller drop in housing wealth.
In the model economy, agents are fully rational and derive utility from
both the consumption of perishable goods and of housing services coming
3In table 2.1, saver and borrower status refers to home owners in 2007. Savers and
borrowers are defined here - and throughout the paper- as households that show respec-
tively a positive or a negative net asset position. A net asset position is defined as the
sum of savings bonds, directly held bonds, the cash value of life insurances, certificates of
deposits, quasi-liquid retirement accounts and all other types of transaction accounts mi-
nus the debt secured by primary residence, the debt secured by other residential property,
credit card debt and other forms of debt. For a detailed description of data please refer
to Appendix 2.6.1.
4Leverage is defined here - and thorough the remaining sections- as the ratio between
net asset position and total housing wealth.
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from housing stock. Housing is the only physical asset in the economy and
it is fixed in supply. This is motivated by the fact that previous and during
the Great Recession, house prices were most volatile in geographical areas
where the supply of houses was relatively fixed.5 The financial friction
arises because agents have to collateralize short positions of one-period
financial asset by a fraction of the expected value of their available housing
stock.
In this otherwise standard model, we introduce a competitive financial in-
termediation sector. All saving and borrowing is conducted though this
sector, which faces exogenous shocks to its technology.6 These shocks give
rise to a spread between borrowing and lending such that the collateral
constraint does not necessarily bind. In other words, it generates endoge-
nous changes in the households’ leverage. The second source of aggregate
disturbance comes from standard aggregate income shocks that directly
affect the households’ endowment of the perishable good. This may be
interpreted as a reduced form way to capture the cyclical behavior of pro-
ductivity shocks.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and simulate the Great Re-
cession as a contemporaneous negative income and financial shock that
follows a period of moderate economic, credit expansion and increasing
leverage. This characterization is due to the empirical observation that
both income and financial intermediation were above (below) the long run
trend before (after) the recession. To calibrate our key parameters we con-
sider moments from both micro and macro data. In particular, we were
able to match the leverage and the wealth share of borrowers relative to
savers using from the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF, waves 1998 -
5See figure IV in Mian and Sufi (2009).
6We consider a simple model for the financial intermediation in the spirit of Cooper
and Ejarque (2000) and Curdia and Woodford (2010). Otherwise, the link to these studies
is limited as the former looks at the business cycle properties of financial shocks within a
representative agent framework, while the latter studies the implications of spread shocks
for the optimal conduct of monetary policy.
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2007). This calibration strategy, although different from the approach of
most papers in the existing literature which target macro moments only,
results in calibrated parameters that are compatible with recent contribu-
tions (Iacoviello and Guerrieri (2012)).
A very delicate issue for the calibration exercise is what time frame to use,
and in particular, whether to incorporate a recession or not. We take the
following stance. Our main goal is to maintain a close link between the
model and the research question. We study the Great Recession as a state-
contingent exogenous event that hit the US economy in late 2007, follow-
ing a period characterized by banking innovation and increasing house-
hold leverage. Therefore, we consider the Great Recession as a low prob-
abilistic event embedded in a business cycle framework. For this reason,
we calibrate the model to data including the quarters of the recession until
2009:II.7 The structural nature of our exercise allows us to conduct counter-
factual experiments in order to disentangle the quantitative effects of in-
come and intermediation shocks on aggregate house prices and agents’
welfare.
We have three major findings. First, we find that our benchmark model
quantitatively explains the observed drop in house prices during the Great
Recession. The majority of the effect is attributed to real income shocks.
Financial intermediation shocks explain only a small percentage of the ob-
served drop. This finding confirms that the observed behavior of aggre-
gate house prices, before and after the Recession, could be partially related
to changes in fully expected shocks. More importantly, we find that, in
contrast to the widespread view, shocks in the financial sector have very
limited quantitative effects on aggregate house prices.
Second, we find that borrowers significantly lost more than savers in the
Great Recession. In particular we highlight a significant difference in the
7For the micro data, SCF is run every three years. We decided to include the 2009 wave
and not to include the 2010 wave of the survey in the analysis in order to be consistent
with the other calibrated parameters in the model. However, even when including the
2010 wave, the targeted values are very similar.
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welfare effects of income and financial intermediation shocks. In the Great
Recession, the negative income shock was the main driver behind the
absolute drop in house prices and the absolute level of agents’ welfare
losses. The financial intermediation shock is instead the main determi-
nant of changes in households’ leverage before and after the house price
drop.8 We show that increasing interest spreads had distributive effects,
with savers gaining at the expense of borrowers. Accordingly we show
that an increase in interest rate spreads forced borrowers to de-leverage
and amplified their welfare losses of house price drop by 37.5% while
causing a 66.7% welfare gain for savers. Moreover, counterfactual experi-
ments show that the high leverage previous to the crisis made borrowers’
welfare losses 25% bigger than if it would have occurred in a state of low
leverage.
Third, we find that if we restrict the collateral constraint so that it always
binds, the amplification effects given by leverage and de-leverage would
have been underestimated; a model with always binding collateral con-
straint which reduces in fact the volatility of the aggregate leverage to
zero. This is an important finding as previous studies (notably, Iacoviello
(2005)) usually assume that the constraints are always binding. The intu-
ition for this result is that when the growth rate of the borrowers’ debt is
forced to be proportional to changes in expected housing wealth, borrow-
ers leverage up more slowly in expansions and de-leverage more slowly in
contractions when compared to our benchmark model. This implies that
when the crisis hits, borrowers have more outstanding debt in the bench-
mark model that they need to roll-over. In a recent paper, Iacoviello and
Guerrieri (2012) explore the quantitative properties of occasionally bind-
ing collateral constraints and the relative non-linear effects coming from
changes in the demand for housing.
8This mechanism is in line with the microeconomic evidence of Mian (2010), who
found that an increase in credit supply, coupled with the effect of collateralized debt on
increasing house prices, created an unprecedented increase in household leverage in the
quarters preceding the crisis
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The mechanism behind the three findings is the following. First, a nega-
tive realization of one or both of the exogenous shocks leads to credit con-
tractions. In a credit contraction - given that it is more costly to roll over
existing debt - borrowers choose optimally to reduce their indebtedness.
If the reduction in debt is sufficiently large, borrowers need to reduce their
housing stock. For a given supply of housing, house prices must therefore
decrease. This causes borrowers to suffer in terms of both wealth and ex-
pected lifetime utility. On the other hand - because of the lower demand
for debt - savers potentially face a lower interest rate on savings. This po-
tentially hurts them by raising the price of future consumption. However,
savers expecting house prices to rise again in the next period - can smooth
their consumption by buying houses when their prices are depressed. Fi-
nally, savers gain in terms of wealth and do not suffer much in terms of
expected lifetime utility. The size of this distributive effect depends cru-
cially on how interest rates move. In this paper we quantitatively show
what exactly distinguishes financial shocks from income shocks. Another
important remark concerns the non-linearity generated by the collateral
constraint. In states of the world where borrowers choose optimally to
move away from the constraint, it becomes slack. That is, borrowers can
choose the pace at which to reduce their debt, unlike the case in models
with an always-binding constraint. This implies a change in the elastic-
ity of the demand for debt and housing with respect to changes in house
prices that could have non-negligible quantitative effects.
The present study is related to two important strands of literature. First,
we relate to the recent literature that studies the financial sector as an au-
tonomous source of macroeconomic fluctuations Jermann and Quadrini
(2012) and the literature that claims that financial frictions played a pre-
eminent role in explaining the observed drop in US aggregate economic
activity Hall (2011). Recently, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011) find that a
shock to the spread between the interest rate on borrowings and the in-
terest rate on savings - in the presence of a collateral constraint that links
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debt to the level of durables - generates a decrease in the borrowers’ de-
mand for durables that grows stronger as agents get closer to the credit
constraint. While their analysis abstracts from aggregate house prices and
endogenous changes in wealth, we explicitly emphasize the channel that
goes through the endogenous change in house prices.
Second, our analysis relates to recent studies on the distributive effects
of the Great Recession. Compared to Glover et al. (2011) - a study on in-
tergenerational redistribution during the Great Recession - we focus on a
different dimension of agent heterogeneity and welfare, namely, redistri-
bution between constrained agents (borrowers) and unconstrained agents
(savers). Similar to Hur (2012), we find that the constrained agents always
lose more than unconstrained agents.9 Both of the aforementioned studies
are silent about the inherent redistributive nature of financial shocks, the
focus of this paper.10
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In the following section we
present the model. Section 2.3 presents the quantitative analysis. In sec-
tion 2.4 we compare the predictions of the benchmark model to alternative
specifications, including the case of an always binding constraint. Section
2.5 concludes.
9Hur (2012) considers an overlapping generations model with collateral constraints; he
finds that the constrained agents are mostly from the young cohort, and that those agents
suffer the most during a recession.
10Another distinguishing element of our analysis to Hur (2012) and Guerrieri and Loren-
zoni (2011), is that they consider the recession as an unanticipated event while, in our econ-
omy, agents take into account the probability of negative aggregate shocks when making
decisions about the future.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 The physical economy
Uncertainty. Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, . . .. In each pe-
riod t, the world experiences one of Z possible exogenous events z ∈ Z =
{1, . . . , Z}. The resolution of uncertainty is represented by an event tree
Σ with root σ0, which is given by a fixed event z0 in which the economy
starts at time 0. Each node is characterized by a history of events, denoted
by σt = (σ0, . . . , σt) ∈ Σt = ×tk=0Σk. Each node has Z immediate succes-
sors (σtz+) and a unique predecessor (σ−t ). The exogenous events follow a
Markov process with transition matrix Π.
Agents and Endowments At each node σt there are two types of agents,
borrowers (denoted by a subscript b) and savers (denoted by a subscript
s). Borrowers and savers differ in their rates of time preference, in the
sense that borrowers discount the future more than savers. Formally, we
have βs > βb, where βi ∈ (0, 1) for i = s, b. Each group consists of in-
finitely many agents but the group size differs: denote by nb and ns the
relative size of the borrower and saver groups. Note that we choose the
normalization nb + ns = 1.
At each node σt, there is a perishable consumption good (non-durable con-
sumption good). The total endowment of the perishable good is stochastic
and depends on the realization of the shock alone, that is, y(σ−t ) = y(z),
where y : Z → R++ is a time-invariant function. Note that there is no id-
iosyncratic uncertainty, the endowment of the perishable good is the same
for both types of households. In addition to the non-durable consumption
good, agents trade houses. Houses are the only physical asset in the econ-
omy and are in fixed net supply. This is motivated by the fact that house
prices were most volatile in counties where the supply of houses remained
relatively fixed as shown by Mian (2010). At period 0, agent i = b, s owns
a stock hi(σ−0 ) ≥ 0 of houses. We normalize
∑
i=b,s hi(σ
−
0 ) = 1.
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At node σt let hi(σt) denote agent i′s end-of-period stock of houses. We as-
sume that houses are traded cum services. That is, buying a house allows
the agent to enjoy the housing services in the same period: if agent i owns
hi(σt) houses then he receives a service stream of 1 · hi(σt). Other than the
service stream, houses do not yield any dividend payments.11
Markets. At each node, spot markets open and agents trade the perish-
able consumption good. We choose the perishable good as the numeraire
and - without loss of generality - normalize its price to be equal to 1.
Agents can trade housing in every period; that is, agents i = s, b can buy a
unit of housing at node σt at price q(σt). As long as hi ≥ 0, there is no pos-
sibility of default since no promises are made when agents hold a positive
amount of the physical asset. In addition to houses, there are two financial
assets, debt and savings, both one-period securities. We denote agent i’s
end-of-period debt holdings by di(σt) and end-of-period savings by si(σt),
respectively. Denote the prices of the respective securities by pj(σt) for
j = d, s. We distinguish these two assets because their effective returns
differ. Debt is assumed to be a security for which only negative (short)
positions are allowed, that is, di(σt) ≤ 0. For savings, agents can only take
positive (long) positions, such that si(σt) ≥ 0, for i = b, s and all σt. Asset
j = d, s traded at σt promises a nominal pay-off bj(σtz) at any successor
node σtz. We normalize bj(σtz) = 1 for all σt, σtz. For the remainder of the
paper, we will discuss pay offs in in terms of real interest rates: denote by
RD(σt) =
1
pd(σt)
the real interest rate on debt and R(σt) = 1ps(σt) the real in-
terest rate on savings. We also restrict borrowers to hold zero savings and
savers to hold zero debt. Formally, for all nodes σt, we have db(σt) ≤ 0,
sb(σt) = 0, ds(σt) = 0, and ss(σt) ≥ 0.12
11These assumptions are for simplicity. We could allow the service stream of houses to
depend on the realization of the shock z or on the identity of the agent.
12This is only for the ease of exposition. When computing the equilibrium policy func-
tions, we allow borrowers and savers to trade both assets, debt and savings. Borrowers
will only want to take long positions in savings for high relative wealth shares. In the
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Collateral Requirements and Default. Similar to Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) we assume limits on debt obligations. Houses are distinguished
from other assets by the fact that they are widely used as collateral for
debt obligations (mortgages). As in Iacoviello and Neri (2010), the theo-
retical justification for collateral constraints is the ability of borrowers to
default on their debt promises. If the borrowers default in some succes-
sor node σtz+, lenders can seize the borrowers’ assets, q(σtz+)hb(σt) by
paying a proportional transaction cost of (1−m)E[q(σtz+)|σt]hb(σt) that is
not redistributed. This transaction cost can be thought of as a loss asso-
ciated with bankruptcy. Lenders will therefore never accept a debt con-
tract where the borrowers’ promises exceed the expected collateral value
of housing. Formally, in each node σt, promises made by the borrower
have to satisfy
RD(σt)d(σt) +mE[q(σtz
+)|σt]hb(σt) ≥ 0. (2.1)
Note that in some successor node z˜ ∈ σtz+ it might still be optimal for the
borrowers to default ex-post. We assume throughout the analysis, how-
ever, that m is small enough that borrowers will never default in equilib-
rium:
ASSUMPTION 1
m ≤ min (q(σtz
+))
E[q(σtz+)|σt] for all σt.
There is no default in equilibrium if and only if this condition is satis-
fied.13 When solving the model equilibrium numerically, we assume that
calibrated economy, this never occurs along the equilibrium path unless the initial wealth
share of the borrowers is very high.
13Assuming default costs equal to zero, borrowers default in some successor node z˜ ∈
σtz
+ iff
−mE[q(σtz+)|σt]hb(σt) + q(z˜)hb(σt) < 0,
That is, whenever the realized value of housing is smaller than the maximum amount
promised. Since in any financial market equilibrium, house prices and - by the Inada
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this condition holds and verify ex post that it is indeed satisfied for all
prices along the equilibrium path. This allows us to treat debt as risk free.14
Utilities and budget constraints Agents i = s, b maximize a time-
separable utility function
Ui(ci, hi) = E0
∞∑
t=0
βti u(cs,t, hs,t) (2.2)
where E0 is the expectation operator at the the starting date t = 0. We
consider period-by-period utility functions u(c, h) : R++ × [0, 1]→ R char-
acterized by constant elasticity of substitution.
u(c, h) =
Ψ(c, h)(1−γ)
1− γ , and Ψ(c, h) = [φc
ρ + (1− φ)hρ] 1ρ
Note that this class of preferences is strictly monotone, continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly concave, and satisfies the Inada conditions for both ci
and hi.
At each node, the savers’ budget constraint is given by
cs(σt) + q(σt)hs(σt) + ss(σt) ≤ y(σt) + ss(σ−t )R(σ−t ) + q(σt)hs(σ−t ) + Υ(st).
(2.3)
conditions - hb are strictly positive for a small enough m, this condition does not hold.
As an alternative to a condition on m, we could just assume default costs are sufficiently
high that it is never optimal for the borrowers to default.
14We evaluated the robustness of our results by replacing equation (2.1) by the following
collateral requirement:
RD(σt)d(σt) +m ·min
(
q(σtz
+)
)
hb(σt) ≥ 0.
This is a tighter constraint and ensures that there is no default in equilibrium, independent
of the value of m. While the qualitative implications remain unaffected, this specification
implied slightly smaller quantitative effects on house prices and welfare. The intuition for
the smaller quantitative effects is that leverage in states of high intermediation is lower
compared to the benchmark model and the wealth distribution is therefore less sensitive
to price changes. We stick to the collateral constraint as outlined in the main text because
it has became standard in macroeconomic models with mortgage debt and thus increases
the comparability of our results.
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The right hand-side is the savers’ available income. It consists of the en-
dowment of the perishable good y(σt), the gross return on savings, and
the housing stock carried over from the previous period. Finally, Υ(st) are
resources that are redistributed in a lump-sum fashion from the financial
sector to the households, of which savers receive a share ns, representing
their share in the population. The reason why we need this re-distribution
will be explained in detail below.
Analogously, the borrowers’ budget constraint reads as
cb(σt) + q(σt)hb(σt) + db(σt) ≤ y(σt) + d(σ−t )RD(σ−t ) + q(σt)hb(σ−t ) + Υ(st).
(2.4)
The right hand-side is the borrowers’ available income. It consists of the
endowment of the perishable good y(σt), the value of housing stock net
of the debt burden from the previous period plus resources being redis-
tributed from the financial sector to the households, of which borrowers
receive the amount Υ(st).
Financial Intermediaries. Intermediaries demand aggregate deposits
S(σt) and supply aggregate debt D(σt). The real pay-offs for each unit lent
are given by the real interest rates, RD(σt) and R(σt), respectively. The col-
lateral constraints and assumption 1 make sure that debt is risk free. The
key distortion in the intermediation sector is similar to that in Cooper and
Ejarque (2000).15 We assume that in each node σt only a fraction of sav-
ings can be transformed into debt. This fraction is stochastic and depends
on the realization of the current shock only. That is, θ(σ−t z) = θ(z) and
θ(z) : Z → (0, 1] is a time-invariant function.
This exogenous financial shock represents a reduced form way to model
the risk-bearing capacity of the financial sector. In particular, changes in
the intermediation technology θ potentially reflect changes in the value of
equity associated with a risky asset portfolio or changes in monitoring by
15Another example for the inclusion of a supply-sided friction in the banking sector into
an international macro model is Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012).
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the bank managers as a consequence of changes in risk aversion. Conse-
quently, while we remain agnostic about the exact foundation of the θ, we
point out that the observed variations in the spread series in the period
2005-2009 mainly reflect changes in the households’ price for risk rather
than changes in the default risk.16
Financial intermediaries are otherwise risk neutral and maximize expected
profits on their portfolio, that is,
max
D(σt),S(σt)≥0
RD(σt)D(σt)−R(σt)Si(σt) (2.5)
subject to the constraint
D(σt) ≤ θ(σt)S(σt). (2.6)
Because intermediaries operate in competitive markets with free entry,
equilibrium interest rates are such that intermediaries make zero profits:
RD(σt)θ(σt)−R(σt) = 0. (2.7)
This last relation implies that there is a spread between loan and deposit
rates in this economy . In particular, the interest rate on debt is always at
least as big as the interest rate on savings, or RD(σt) ≥ R(σt).
Transfers from the Banking sector to the Household sector. Com-
pleting the description model, we specify the re-distribution function Υ(st).
The intermediation process as outlined above implies an aggregate inter-
mediation loss in terms of real resources that, in equilibrium, is given by
(1 − θ(σt))S(σt). This can be easily verified by combining the households
budget constraints, using market clearing conditions in the debt and sav-
ings markets, and the zero profit condition of financial intermediaries. The
aggregate resource constraint, then, reads as:
nbcb(σt) + nscs(σt) + (1− θ(σt))S(σt) = y(σt) + Υ(st)
16The inclusion of a more detailed micro-founded banking sector is an interesting avenue
that we leave for future research.
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On the left hand side, we have the borrowers’ and savers’ consumption
plus the resources ‘eaten up’ by the financial sector. On the right hand side
we have aggregate income plus total transfers. In order to keep the inter-
mediation process as a purely redistributive distortion, we choose Υ(st)
such that all resources ‘lost’ in the intermediation sector are redistributed
back to the agents, so that aggregate consumption is a function of aggre-
gate income only. Therefore, aggregate transfers are defined as follows:
Υ(st) ≡ (1− θ(σt))S(σt) (2.8)
We interpret this transfer as income generated by the intermediation sec-
tor that is redistributed back to the households because they are either
the managers of the bank or the residual claimants on the portfolio rev-
enues of the bank. The inclusion of the transfer function has two advan-
tages. The first is that any effect of a θ shock on house prices and wel-
fare comes through the effect on interest rates, and is not generated by
an aggregate loss of resources. The second advantage is computational,
as the re-distribution of resources makes sure that aggregate consumption
is a function of aggregate endowment only, an essential requirement for
the application of the concept of wealth recursive equilibria proposed by
Kubler and Schmedders (2003) to our framework.
2.2.2 Financial Market Equilibrium with Intermedia-
tion and Houses as Collateral
The economy is a collection of period-by-period utility functions, impa-
tience parameters, state-dependent endowments and state-dependent fi-
nancial intermediation efficiency, aggregate transfers, transition probabil-
ities, and the bankruptcy cost in case of default,
E =
(
u,
(
βi, yi, hi(σ
−
0 )
)
i=b,s
, θ,Υ,Π,m
)
.
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DEFINITION 1 A financial markets equilibrium for an economy E , initial hous-
ing stocks (hi(σ−0 ))i=b,s and initial shock z0 is a collection(
(h¯b(σt), d¯b(σt), c¯b(σt)), (h¯s(σt), d¯s(σt), c¯s(σt)), (D¯(σt), S¯(σt)),
q¯(σt), R¯D(σt), R¯(σt), Υ¯(σt)
)
σt∈Σ
satisfying the following conditions:
(1) Markets clear for all σt ∈ Σ:
nbh¯b(σt) + nsh¯s(σt) = 1
D¯(σt) + nbd¯b(σt) = 0
S¯(σt)− nss¯s(σt) = 0
(2) For borrowers,
(h¯b(σt), d¯b(σi), c¯b(σt)) ∈ arg max
cb≥0,hb≥0,db≤0
Ub(cb, hb)
such that for all σt ∈ Σ
cb(σt) + q¯(σt)hb(σt) + db(σt) ≤ y(σt) + db(σ−t )R¯D(σ−t ) + q¯(σt)hb(σ−t ) + Υ¯(σt)
R¯D(σt)db(σt) +m · E[q¯(σtz)|σt]hb(σt) ≥ 0
(3) For savers,
(h¯s(σt), s¯s(σi), c¯s(σt)) ∈ arg max
cs≥0,hs≥0,ss≥0
Us(cs, hs)
such that for all σt ∈ Σ
cs(σt) + q¯(σt)hs(σt) + ss(σt) ≤ y(σt) + ss(σ−t )R¯(σ−t ) + q¯(σt)hs(σ−t ) + Υ¯(σt)
(4) For financial intermediaries
(D¯(σt), S¯(σi)) ∈ arg max
D≥0,S≥0
R¯D(σt)D(σt)− R¯(σt)S(σt)
such that for all σt ∈ Σ
D(σt) ≤ θ(σt)S(σt)
64
Oliviero, Tommaso (2014), Financial intermediation and the great recession : microeconomic and macroeconomic issues 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11929
(5) Free entry for financial intermediaries
R¯D(σt)D¯(σt)− R¯(σt)S¯(σt) = 0
(6) Per-capita transfers are given by
Υ¯(σt) = (1− θ(σt))S¯(σt)
2.2.3 Wealth Recursive Equilibria
For the quantitative exercise, we define a wealth recursive formulation
in the spirit of Kubler and Schmedders (2003). Since we have only two
agents, the relative wealth of one agent, defined by a single value on the
unit interval, uniquely define the complement of the other agent relative
wealth; the borrowers’ beginning-of-period wealth-share is :17
ωb(σt) =
q(σt)hb(σ
−
t ) +RD(σ
−
t )d(σ
−
t )
q(σt)
(2.9)
Note that the collateral constraints, the constraints on asset holdings, and
the utility functions satisfying Inada-conditions, together with assumption
1, imply that the wealth share lies in the unit interval, ωb ∈ [0, 1]; by defini-
tion, ωs = 1− ωb. The equilibrium policy function is then a function of the
discrete exogenous state variable z and the financial wealth distribution is
Ω = (ωb, 1− ωb).
As we solve for an equilibrium numerically, we follow Kubler and Schmed-
ders (2003) and compute -equilibria.18 For the approximation of the equi-
librium policy functions we adopt the time-iteration algorithm with linear
interpolation proposed by Grill and Brumm (2010). That is, we approxi-
mate the equilibrium policy on a fine grid for the borrowers’ wealth share.
For points outside the grid we use linear piecewise interpolation. See ap-
pendix 2.6.2 for a detailed description of the algorithm.
17Here, we used the market clearing conditions for the housing, debt, and savings mar-
kets and the fact that financial intermediaries make zero-profits in equilibrium, so that
hb(σ
−
t ) + hs(σ
−
t ) = 1 and RD(σ
−
t )db(σ
−
t ) +R(σ
−
t )ss(σ
−
t ) = 0.
18For a definition and interpretation of -equilibria, we refer to the original text.
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2.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section studies the quantitative effects of the Great Recession on house
prices and households’ welfare. The Great Recession is modeled as con-
temporaneous negative shocks to both aggregate income and financial in-
termediation (mortgage rate spread). In this way, our simulation is driven
by the empirical facts that motivated our research question. The next sub-
section outlines our calibration strategy. We then have a short section on
the long-run stationary wealth distribution and we present our quantita-
tive results on welfare effects.
2.3.1 Calibration
In the benchmark calibration, we assume an elasticity of substitution be-
tween houses and consumption equal to 1, so that ρ = 0. Risk aversion
is set equal to γ = 2. These are standard values used in the literature. In
general, it is not straightforward to calibrate these parameters as macro
and micro evidence span a relatively large sets of parameter estimates. As
in Glover et al. (2011), the risk aversion γ is the crucial parameter for the
elasticity of house prices with respect to aggregate shocks. The elasticity of
substitution between consumption and savings plays an important role for
the elasticity of welfare gains/losses to changes in the wealth distribution.
Therefore, in section 2.4, we provide a sensitivity analysis for different
values of the risk aversion parameter and allow for some substitutability
between housing and non-durable consumption as recently found by Ba-
jari et al. (2010). Notice that one period in the model corresponds to one
quarter in the data.
Insert Table 2.2 here
The parameter φ is the expenditure share of non-durable consumption.
We pick the value to match the average housing wealth over GDP in the
data during the period 1998-2007. For aggregate housing wealth, we used
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the sum of the value of owner occupied real estate of private households
plus the residential housing wealth of non-financial non-corporate private
business. The savers’ discount factor βs is set so that the average interest
rate on savings in the model matches the average return on savings, equal
to 1.5% during 1998 - 2007 (at annualized level). The borrowers’ discount
factor βb and m are jointly calibrated to match the average wealth share
of the borrowers and the leverage ratio of the borrowers. Since there is
not necessarily a one-to-one mapping between the parameters and their
targets, we follow an iterative procedure to find values for βs, βb, m and
φ. That is, we first guess values for the parameters and then compare the
computed moments to their counterparts in the data. If they do not match,
we change the values and repeat until they do. The procedure leads to a
quite satisfactorily match between model and data moments.19
The relative population size of borrowers is set to 42%, corresponding
to the fraction of borrowers in the SCF when using the weighted aver-
age share of households with a negative net asset position as defined in
appendix 2.6.1. This estimate is in line with the calibration in Iacoviello
(2008).
The stochastic processes for the exogenous state variables yt and θt are
assumed to be independent. This is in line with the correlation in the
data.20 We assume that both aggregate income and the intermediation
spread shock take two values each, that is yt = {yL, yH} and θt = {θL, θH}.
For the intermediation shock, we assume that the transition probabilities
19The variable definitions used to calculate the data moments are as close as possible
to the definition of the model counterparts. For a detailed description of how we compute
the relative wealth share and the leverage ratio in the data, see appendix 2.6.1.
20We also conducted a VAR analysis for GDP growth and spreads for different lag-
lengths and orderings and found no evidence for significant spillover terms and no con-
temporaneous correlations between GDP and mortgage spreads. Only in one specification
(VAR of order two), the null of a Granger-causality of output growth on spreads is re-
jected, though the coefficients for individual lags of output were not significantly different
from zero.
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are given by:
piij = (1− ρ)pij + δijρ for i, j = H,L
where δij = 1 if i = j and 0 otherwise; pij > 0 is the unconditional probabil-
ity of being in state j, and by definition we have
∑
j pij = 1. The parameter
ρ governs the persistence of the shock.21 The unconditional probability of
a high intermediation efficiency, P (θ = θH), is set to 0.565, the fraction of
quarters in which the U.S. experienced low spreads between 1998:I and
2009:II. We set θL = 0.99207, θH = 0.9985, and ρθ = 0.868 so that we match
the mean, standard deviation and the autocorrelation of the spreads in the
data (for the data counterparts see table; for a description of the data see
appendix 2.6.1).
For the income shock, we choose yH and yL to match the mean, normalized
to E(y) = 1, and an average peak-to-trough drop in GDP of 5% during a
recession. The conditional probability of the low realization of y being in
a recession today piyLL is chosen to match an average duration of a reces-
sion equal to five quarters. This is in line with the NBER recession dates
between 1980:I and 2009:II. The transition probability of the high income
realization conditional on high income today, piyHH = 1 − (1 − piyLL)1−pi
y
H
piyH
,
is obtained by setting the unconditional probability of a recession equal to
15% (piH = 0.85). This is in line with NBER recession dates between 1980:I
and 2009:II.
To summarize, the exogenous state space is then given by Σ = {(yH , θH),
(yL, θH), (yH , θL), (yL, θL)} and - given the assumption that income and in-
termediation processes are uncorrelated - the transition matrix for the ex-
ogenous process is just the Kronecker product of the individual transition
probability matrices for the income shock and the intermediation shock.
Table 2.2 summarizes the calibrated parameter values and the targets.
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Figure 2.3: Wealth distribution
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2.3.2 Stationary wealth distribution
Figure 2.3 shows the long-run stationary wealth distribution simulated
over one million time periods.22 Recall that the wealth distribution across
agents is entirely summarized by the borrowers’ fraction of wealth ωb.
On average, the borrowers hold 11.7% of the total wealth of the economy
(which is equal to the value of housing q). The distribution of the borrow-
ers’ wealth share is concentrated around the mean and has a spike to the
right at around 12.6%, which correspond to states of the world when there
is a long period of credit and income expansion. In these states, the bor-
rowers’ collateral constraint is binding and the interest rate on borrowing
is relatively low; demand for housing is high and expected house prices
21See Backus et al. (1989) and Mendoza (1991)
22Because of the simple persistence rule used to discretize the exogenous processes, the
high number of simulation periods makes sure that the exogenous processes have the same
stochastic properties as their data counterparts.
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are therefore high. This marginally relaxes the constraint, so that aggregate
debt and savings are high. Because house prices are rising and borrowers
are accumulating housing, their wealth share increases. Conversely, neg-
ative realizations of aggregate shocks make the borrowers’ wealth share
drop. We will explain these mechanisms in detail in the following sec-
tion(s).
2.3.3 Welfare effects in the Great Recession
We now turn to our main quantitative exercise, the estimation of welfare
effects of the Great Recession. For this purpose we construct an event win-
dow around the Great Recession. We define the Great Recession as a state
of the world with low income and high spreads that is preceded by a state
of the world where income is high and spreads are low (i.e. intermediation
is high). We then go along the equilibrium path of the simulated economy
and select all sequences that match these criteria. In figure 2.4, we plot the
average of selected realizations over all sequences including ten quarters
preceding the crisis and ten quarters after the crisis. We compare the Great
Recession to two counter-factual scenarios. First, we ask what would hap-
pen if spreads were low before and stayed low during the recession (this
corresponds to the long dashed line in 2.4 which we label as low-spreads se-
ries). This experiment helps us to compare the welfare effects of a negative
income shock when leverage is high or low before the shock realizes. Sec-
ond, we look at a recession that occurs when spreads where already high
before and during the crisis (short dashed line in figure 2.4 which we label
as high-spreads ). By comparing this scenario, with the Great Recession, we
calculate the welfare effects of de-leveraging in the crisis.
Panel (a) and (b) show the evolution of income and mortgage spreads.
In all scenarios, income first increases previous to the recession and then
drops by 5 percent in period 0 when the recession hits. In the Great Reces-
sion, mortgage spread first decreases towards its lowest value in period−1
and then jump to 3.5 percent in period 0. In the low-spreads counterfactual
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Figure 2.4: Great Recession (solid line) versus different intermediation
regimes
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scenario spreads decline and stay in their lowest realization in periods −1
and 0 and then return towards their long-run mean, around 1.75 percent
per annum. Similarly in the high-spreads counterfactual scenario, spreads
increase slowly previous to the recession, peaking at 3.5 percent p.a. in pe-
riod 0 and then return slowly towards their long-run mean. From panel (c)
it is evident that house-prices are clearly driven by aggregate income and
not by mortgage spreads. Mortgage spreads, however, have an important
impact on the borrowers’ leverage ratio, defined as end-of-period lever-
age or LEoPt = − dtqthbt ; when spreads are low, borrowers leverage up by in-
creasing their debt holdings faster than their housing wealth. This means
they move towards the constraint. In our simulation, in the pre-crisis,
leverage peaks at around 50 percent. When spreads increase in period 0,
it becomes too costly for borrowers to roll-over their mortgages and de-
leverage sharply so that the constraint gets slack. This is reflected by the
multiplier associated with the collateral constraint that drops to zero. The
time-path of leverage looks quiet different under the other two counter-
factual scenarios. In the low-spreads case, borrowers stay leveraged also in
period 0 and then de-leverage slowly following the path of spreads. In the
high-spreads case, aggregate leverage is already low previous to the nega-
tive income shock and borrowers are pushed towards the collateral con-
straint in period 0 when house prices fall. This is because borrowers search
to smooth the recession by borrowing up to the limit (which is tighter be-
cause the house price drops in the recession). This is also reflected by the
increase in the multiplier on the collateral constraint shown in panel (e).
Therefore, shocks to financial intermediation affects the borrowers’ lever-
age ratio through the relative price of debt (the mortgage spread). Panels
(f) and (g) show the paths for housing wealth for borrowers and savers,
respectively. This figures illustrate the following. If mortgage spreads
would have stayed low during the recession (low-spreads case), borrow-
ers would have lost less in terms of housing wealth than in the bench-
mark scenario, whereas savers would have lost more housing wealth. The
72
Oliviero, Tommaso (2014), Financial intermediation and the great recession : microeconomic and macroeconomic issues 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11929
movements in leverage and housing wealth are reflected by the evolution
of borrowers’ wealth share, shown in panel (h). In this panel the solid line
shows drop much more than the the long-dashed line. Importantly the
wealth share recovers much slower after the Great Recession compared to
the case when mortgage spreads would have stayed low during the crisis.
This means that borrowers negative wealth shock is quite persistent in the
Great Recession. Finally, panels (i) and (j) show the corresponding welfare
gains for the two type of households (in consumption equivalents relative
to long-run expected utility, for a formal definition see next paragraph).
Borrowers lose the most in the Great Recession while savers lose the least
when compared to the other counterfactual scenarios. Note that only after
two or three quarters, savers’ expected life-time utility becomes positive
and stays persistently above zero. This indicates substantial redistribu-
tive forces that is connected to the discussion about the borrowers’ relative
wealth share.
These findings are quantitatively formalized in table 2.3. The table com-
pares the model predictions with the data (we observe the on-impact change
in house price, the change in housing wealth for borrowers and savers in
the period 2007-2009) and - in addition - shows the average change in bor-
rowers’ wealth share and the welfare gains/losses in the recession for the
two types of households, denoted by λb and λs, respectively. We define
welfare gains in two ways. First, we define welfare gains of the recession
as the compensation that is needed to make agents indifferent between the
expected life-time utility in period−1 (i.e. the quarter that precedes the re-
cession) and expected life-time utility in period 0 (i.e. the quarter when the
recession hits). Negative numbers therefore reflect welfare losses of the re-
cession. We refer to these numbers as ‘on-impact welfare gains’. Second, we
report welfare gains of the expected life time-utility that agents have 7 pe-
riods23 after the recession relative to the average expected life-time utility,
that is
∑4
σ=1 piσVi(ω(σ), σ) for i = b, s.
24 Also in this case we report the wel-
23The recent recession lastet 7 quarters according to NBER recession dates.
24The probability piσ is the unconditional (or stationary) probability that state σ ∈ Σ
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fare gains in percent of total consumption compensation that is needed
to make agents indifferent between the two alternatives. We refer to this
second type as ’welfare gains after 7 periods’.
Insert Table 2.3 here
Based on figure 2.4 and table 2.3 we can summarize the following two key
findings:
1. High leverage makes the borrowers’ wealth share more sensitive to
house price changes.
2. A negative intermediation shock, when coupled with a negative in-
come shock, results in higher (smaller) welfare losses for borrowers
(savers).
Result 1 says that the higher the leverage ratio in the economy when enter-
ing a recession, the more the wealth gets distributed away from borrowers
to savers. In other words, a given house price drop due to an aggregate
income shock leads to more bigger wealth losses for borrowers to savers
when there is more leverage prior to the shock. If the economy is experi-
encing high intermediation efficiency previous to a recession, the leverage
ratio of borrowers will be high. The borrowers’ wealth share will then be
very sensitive to price changes.
Result 2 deals with the second question raised in the introduction: whether
a larger redistribution of wealth translates into more inequality in terms
of welfare. We find that this crucially depends on whether the collateral
constraint binds. That is, whether borrowers wish to stay up against the
constraint, or move away from it. This result implies that the wealth loss
from a recession only translates into a larger (smaller) welfare loss for
borrowers (savers) when there is a simultaneous deterioration in the ef-
ficiency of financial intermediation. In particular, when spreads would
occurs.
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have stayed low during the recession, shown in row three, the borrowers’
welfare gain would have been 17 percent higher compared to the Great Re-
cession. Savers would have lost three times more compared to the Great
Recession. The intuition for both results is summarized in the following
two paragraphs.
Intuition for Key Result 1 Let us now show the intuition behind these
results graphically. To see the effects on the wealth distribution, we can
rewrite the borrowers’ wealth share in terms of the leverage ratio:
wb,t = hb,t−1(1− LBoP (qt)) (2.10)
where LBoP (qt) = −RD,t−1db,t−1qthb,t−1 denotes the beginning of period leverage
carried over from last period, evaluated at the house price of the current
period.25 Taking the total derivatives of the wealth share around qt =
qt−1, one can see that the growth rate of the borrowers’ wealth share is
proportional to the growth rate of house prices and the proportionality
factor is a function of leverage:
dwb,t
wb,t
=
L(q)
1− L(q)
dq
q
.
If financial intermediation efficiency is low and spreads are high, leverage
is likely to be small and a given drop in house prices translates into a
smaller drop in wealth. In other words, when borrowers’ leverage is high,
any aggregate price drop makes borrowers - on impact - relatively poorer
in terms of wealth.
Of course, the price today is an equilibrium outcome; that is, the pricing
function depends on the state of the economy. We have no closed form
25Note that by assumption 1, LBoP (qt) is strictly smaller than one. This can be seen
by the following. When leverage is high, most likely the collateral constraint is binding.
Using the collateral constraint from last period and substituting it into the definition of
beginning-of-period leverage, one obtains mEt−1(qt)qt . By assumption 1 and verified ex-post
along the equilibrium path, this object is smaller than one.
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solution for this pricing function but we can plot the equilibrium house
prices as a function of the wealth share using the simulated economy. This
function is - for any realization of the exogenous shock z ∈ Z - decreasing
in wb, or
q = Q(wb, z)
∂Q
∂wb
< 0. (2.11)
Given the promised value of previous-period debt, RD,t−1db,t−1, and given
the housing stock carried over from last period, hb,t−1, the equilibrium
wealth share in period t is implicitly defined by the solution to (2.10) and
(2.11), or
wb,t = hb,t−1
(
1 +
RD,t−1db,t−1
Q(wb,t, zt)hb,t−1
)
(2.12)
Figure 2.5 plots the left-hand side and right hand side of equation (2.12)
as a function of the borrowers’ wealth share wb for different income real-
izations and for given assumptions on the level of debt and housing level.
The solid line plots the right-hand side of equation 2.5 under the assump-
tion that value of debt and housing stock in t − 1 are relatively high (i.e.
intermediation efficiency was high), while the dashed line assumes that
debt and housing stock carried over from the previous period are low (i.e.
financial efficiency was low).26 When the previous period debt is high
(solid line), the wealth share is more sensitive to exogenous shocks to in-
come (drop from point AH to AL) compared to the case when debt carried
over from last period is relatively low (drop from BH to BL). This illus-
trates the relationship between leverage and wealth dynamics during a
recession: the effect comes from a different elasticity of wealth with re-
spect to changes in prices which, in turn, depend on the aggregate state of
financial intermediation.
Intuition for Key Result 2. Result (2) relates to combined income and
negative intermediation shock. When house prices fall and there is a con-
26We set the respective values for housing stock and debt equal to the average value in
period −1 of the event window above for the respective intermediation regime.
76
Oliviero, Tommaso (2014), Financial intermediation and the great recession : microeconomic and macroeconomic issues 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11929
Figure 2.5: Response of equilibrium wealth share to a negative income shock,
for previously high (solid lines) versus low intermediation (dashed lines)
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Notes: The figure plots the left-hand side (45 degree line) and the right hand side of equation (2.12) as a
function of the borrowers’ wealth share wb and for different intermediation regimes. The solid lines show
the right-hand side under the assumption that hb,t−1 and RD,t−1db,t−1 are relatively high (in absolute
value) because of high financial intermediation. Given the assumption on debt and housing, point AH
materializes if income stays high whereas AL is the wealth share when income drops to yL. The dashed
line shows the right-hand side under the assumption that hb,t−1 and RD,t−1db,t−1 are relatively low, that
is for low intermediation. In this scenario, BH is the wealth share that materializes when income stays
high, whereas the wealth share drops to BL when income falls to yL
temporaneous negative intermediation shock, borrowers face a higher in-
terest rate on debt, which prevents them from rolling over the debt and
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moving away from the collateral constraint. This forces the borrowers to
substantially decrease their stock of housing.
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium housing policy depends non-linear on wealth when
financial intermediation efficiency changes from high to low
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Figure 2.6 plots the borrowers’ housing stock policy function for high and
low intermediation efficiency (respectively solid and dashed line). Fol-
lowing the Great Recession, the relative wealth of the borrower drops. As
financial intermediation also drops during the recession from high to low
efficiency, the housing stock drops from A to C. This is a substantially
larger drop than would have occurred had the efficiency of intermedia-
tion stayed high. In this case, for the same drop in wealth, the decrease
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of the housing stock would have been less sharp (from A to B). In other
words, the elasticity of demand for housing with respect to income shocks
depends on the efficiency of the financial intermediation sector.
Summary of the welfare effects. First, both agents lose in response
to an aggregate negative income shock, and borrowers always lose more
than savers because they are financially constrained and unable to cushion
themselves from negative shocks. Second, while borrowers experience a
welfare loss in the case of a negative financial intermediation shock, savers
are virtually unaffected. Third, in the simulated recession, we observe that
the borrowers’ welfare loss is larger than the algebraic sum of the welfare
losses in response to negative income and intermediation shocks in isola-
tion. The opposite is true for the savers. This comes from a non-linearity in
the reaction of consumption that comes when borrowers are forced to de-
leverage and move away from the collateral constraint. In such a scenario
savers can even gain from the joint income and intermediation shock (rel-
ative to an income shock alone) because they become relatively wealthier.
This set of results leads to the conclusion that, following the Great Reces-
sion, while both types of agents experienced a welfare loss, savers could
cushion themselves from the negative impact of the negative aggregate
shocks by substituting their savings for depreciated houses. This con-
clusion, while qualitatively comparable with the recent findings of Hur
(2012), highlights a different mechanism. In this model, savers are able to
cushion themselves from the negative effects of the Great Recession be-
cause of the asymmetric effects of financial intermediation shocks and the
high level of leverage prior to the shock.
An important remark relating to the magnitudes of the obtained welfare
estimates concerns the error analysis of our numerical algorithm. That is,
if the mistakes agents make using our algorithm are larger (in consump-
tion equivalents) than the calculated welfare gains/losses, these numbers
would have no quantitative validity. We find that the maximum relative
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Euler Error of our approximation is 3e-5 (or -4.5 in log(10)-scale). This
implies that an agent, using our approximation of the equilibrium policy
functions, would lose 30 Dollars for each million spent. For details see
appendix 2.6.6. We therefore conclude that our quantitative findings are
valid and quantitatively meaningful.
2.3.4 Always binding collateral constraint
We solve the model employing a global solution method rather than the
more widely used log-linearization method. This is necessary in order to
take into account the fact that the collateral constraint is not always bind-
ing, but comes at the cost of a more complex numerical implementation.
In this section we show how large is the cost of assuming always binding
constraints in this framework.
To this end, we solve an alternative specification of the model by forc-
ing the borrowers to have an always-binding constraint. In this case, the
leverage ratio of the economy is always equal to mEt−1qt
qt
, which therefore
needs to be re-calibrated for this specification in order to match the lever-
age ratio we find in data. The results are summarized in table 2.4. Com-
pared to the benchmark model, we find that in a version of the model with
always-binding collateral constraints: (i) the quantitative effects on house
prices are larger relative to the benchmark model for a negative finan-
cial intermediation shock; ii) in the Great Recession, the welfare losses for
borrowers (savers) are smaller (higher) in absolute terms. To summarize,
the borrowers’ welfare loss is lower by 0.07 percentage points (in absolute
terms), while the savers’ lose 0.04 percentage points more when compared
to the benchmark model. Most importantly, the non-linearity of previous-
period leverage completely vanishes, as the borrowers’ wealth losses and
the agents’ welfare gains are just the algebraic sum of the effects when the
economy is hit with each shock separately.
Insert Table 2.4 here
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Figure 2.7: Great Recession in benchmark model (solid line) versus always
binding constraint (dashed line)
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The reason for these differences is that models with always binding con-
straint have the peculiarity of a constant elasticity of demand for debt with
respect to changes in interest rate. In other words, following a spread
shock, the borrowers’ change in next period’s debt has to be strictly pro-
portional to the present discounted value of the drop in next period’s
housing wealth. When debt is costly, borrowers are prevented from mov-
ing away from the constraint. Aggregate debt moves less with respect to
the benchmark case and this, in equilibrium, reduces the savers’ ability
to switch from savings to housing. This is the reason why house prices
drop more in response to a negative intermediation shock. The elasticity
of borrowers’ wealth share to any given drop in house prices is always
constant and given by m
AB
1−mAB , where the superscript stands for ’always
binding’. Note that, in order to match the average leverage ratio in the
data, mAB = 0.45, which is lower than m = 0.5 in the benchmark cal-
ibration. The elasticity of the borrowers’ wealth share is therefore con-
stant, and is strictly less than one. This result suggests that the assumption
of always-binding collateral constraints is not innocuous when making a
welfare analysis.
2.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we compare the quantitative implications of changing the
elasticity of substitution between housing and non-durable consumption,
and the coefficient of risk aversion. Note that, for all changes in these pa-
rameters, we re-calibrate the rest of the parameters that in order to match
the targeted data moments. This allows us to compare the relative perfor-
mance of each parameterization with the benchmark case.
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2.4.1 Elasticity of substitution between housing and
non-durable consumption
Here we conduct a sensitivity analysis for one of the two parameters that
we fixed in the benchmark calibration to unity: the elasticity of substi-
tution between housing and non-durable consumption. Table 2.5 summa-
rizes the quantitative findings for a higher level of substitutability between
housing and non-durable consumption, setting ρ = 1.25.27
Insert Table 2.5 here
Table 2.5 shows that, with increasing substitutability between housing and
non-durable consumption, house prices (and therefore wealth) react more
strongly to an intermediation shock when compared to the benchmark
case. This, like in the case with the always-binding constraint, results
in a decreased elasticity of demand for debt with respect to changes in
the interest rate for borrowing. In addition, the Great Recession leads to
smaller (bigger) welfare losses for borrowers’ (savers’) in this calibration.
Borrowers are hurt less because they substitute housing for non-durable
consumption, which is less painful when these goods are substitutes. This
is also the reason why there is less redistribution in terms of welfare from
borrowers to savers. Though, in absolute terms, savers lose more. Never-
theless, the key findings relating to the role of leverage in wealth dynamics
and the role of the intermediation shock in a recession are unchanged.
2.4.2 Risk aversion
In this section we show quantitative analyses of Great Recession episodes
for different values of the risk aversion parameter taken from the related
27This parameter value is taken from Piazzesi et al. (2007), who consider a represen-
tative agent framework with housing; As mentioned earlier in the paper, an elasticity
of substitution larger than one between housing and non-durable consumption has also
recently been found by Bajari et al. (2010).
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literature. In particular, while the business cycle literature usually features
a log-separable utility function with elasticity of substitution and risk aver-
sion equal to unity, the macro-finance literature and recent contributions
on the distributive effects of the Great Recession focus on a broader set of
parameter values for risk aversion.28 Table 2.6 summarizes the effects of
the simulated Great Recession for the benchmark and other model speci-
fications for different values of the risk aversion parameter.
Insert Table 2.6 here
As in Glover et al. (2011), the higher is the coefficient of risk aversion,
the higher is the negative impact of a recession on equilibrium aggre-
gate house prices. The the observed drop in the house price during the
Great Recession is consistent for a risk aversion parameter between 2 and
3. The welfare analysis also confirms that bigger wealth shocks (due to the
drop in house prices) translate into larger negative welfare effects for bor-
rowers. This effect is again amplified by financial intermediation shocks,
which make it more difficult to smooth negative income shocks. In con-
trast, savers are more able to cushion themselves from the negative effects
of the Great Recession. The intuition is the same as in the benchmark
model. Following the reduction in aggregate debt, savers are able to real-
locate their portfolios from savings towards housing (when it is relatively
cheap). Consequently, the higher is the coefficient of risk aversion, the
smaller are the overall welfare losses for savers.
28Glover et al. (2011) set the risk aversion equal to 3 in the benchmark case, and then
conduct a sensitivity analysis. They find that the magnitude of equilibrium price responses
increase non-monotonically as risk aversion increases. Piazzesi et al. (2007), in a capital
asset pricing model with housing, find that a model featuring a higher level of risk aversion
better performs in matching the moments of housing returns.
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2.5 Conclusions
Using a dynamic general equilibrium model calibrated to the US economy,
we evaluate the quantitative effects of (i) aggregate income shocks and
(ii) shocks to financial intermediation on house prices and on the welfare
of two types of agents: leveraged agents (borrowers) and non-leveraged
agents (savers).
The quantification of welfare costs associated with the US Great Reces-
sion along this cross-section complements recent contributions Glover et
al. (2011) and Hur (2012) and adds a new mechanism stemming from
shocks within the capital market. Our set-up is well suited for the eval-
uation of the welfare consequences of credit supply shocks in a recession,
and complements other recent studies by exploring the effects of financial
intermediation shocks in a model with endogenous collateral constraints.
We find that, following a shock modeled on the Great Recession, all the
agents in the economy experience a welfare loss, and borrowers always
lose more than savers. This finding comes from the fact that savers, being
unconstrained, change their portfolio allocations and smooth the negative
shock by buying the deflated asset (housing). We find that a financial inter-
mediation shock that occurs in a recession forces borrowers to de-leverage,
and amplifies the re-distribution from savers to borrowers, which translate
in higher welfare losses for the latter.
Finally, we find that, in a model where borrowers are always borrow-
ing constrained, the non-linearity in the amplification mechanism coming
from the financial intermediation shock vanishes, and the effects on wealth
and welfare are smaller.
We provide a number of sensitivity checks. While the redistributive ef-
fects (both in terms of wealth and welfare) between borrowers and savers
are decreasing in the substitutability between housing and non-durable
consumption, the drop in house prices is bigger when risk aversion is
stronger, leading to a proportional increase in redistribution.
Although the paper focuses on the distributive effects of the Great Reces-
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sion on borrowers and savers, we do not explicitly consider the possibility
that borrowers can default on their debt obligations. While this could po-
tentially benefit borrowers at the expense of their creditors, empirical evi-
dence suggests that this feature of the U.S. Great Recession was restricted
to a subset of borrowers, the sub-primers, who are not explicitly modeled
here. Adding this third form of heterogeneity to the analysis is, in our
opinion, an interesting avenue for future research.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Data
The following series used in Figure 1 and Figure 2 are from Federal Re-
serve Economic Data: the federal funds rate, the one year mortgage in-
terest rate (released by the Primary Mortgage Market Survey by Freddie
Mac), the mortgage (defined as home mortgages from the balance sheet
of U.S. households and nonprofit organizations) and real estate (defined
as the market value of real estate from the balance sheet of U.S. house-
holds and nonprofit organizations). All series are at quarterly frequency.
The series for house prices is the National Composite Home Price Index
for the United States (the release is by S&P/Case-Shiller Home Price In-
dices). The spread has been calculated as the difference between the one
year mortgage interest rate and the federal funds rate each quarter.
In the calibration section, we calculate housing wealth as percentage of US
nominal GDP (yearly) by using historical data of the flows of funds tables
from the Board of Governors. US nominal GDP is from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis. Our definition of housing wealth includes the market
value of real estate belonging to households, non-profit and non-financial
non-corporate business.
The micro-data used for the calibration of the relative wealth distribution
of borrowers and the leverage ratio are provided by the 1998 to 2009 waves
of Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). Unfortunately, the SCF does not
provide information on the precise date at which households were inter-
viewed. Consequently, we assume that the observed portfolios in 2009
reflect the distribution of household net worth at the end of 2007. Averag-
ing for all the waves between 1998 and 2009 helps in targeting data mo-
ments that are not strongly influenced by the years preceding the Great
Recession. Surveyed households have been partitioned into borrowers and
savers depending on their net asset position. The net asset position is de-
fined as the sum of savings bonds, directly held bonds, the cash value
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of life insurance, certificates of deposits, quasi-liquid retirement accounts
and all other types of transaction accounts (we consider these aggregated
values to be deposits in the model) minus the debt secured by primary res-
idence (mortgages, home equity loans, etc.) and the debt secured by other
residential property, credit card debt and other forms of debt (we refer to
these aggregated values as debt in the model). If the net asset position is
positive, we consider the household to be a saver in our model economy,
otherwise we consider her to be a borrower. The reason to use a broad
definition of aggregate deposits and debt in the data counterpart is that it
is difficult to target borrowers and savers by strictly restricting attention to
particular classes of debt. We moreover define net wealth per capita as the
sum of the net asset position and the value of the primary residence and
other residential properties, for both leveraged and net savers. Finally, we
aggregate the net wealth of both groups (borrowers and savers) and we
calculate the relative net wealth of borrowers as the ratio between their
net wealth over the total net wealth in the economy. The leverage ratio
of the borrowers is instead obtained as the weighted average mean (using
SCF sample weights) of the net asset position over the value of primary
and secondary residences. The reference values that are matched by the
model are obtained by cutting the 5% tails of the distribution of net worth
in each wave of the SCF This is done to cut the extreme observations that
may bias the average values of net worth in the US economy. We want, in
fact, to avoid the possibility of including in the range of borrower house-
holds that maintain large positions in the stock or housing markets and
hold little savings.
2.6.2 Numerical Details
The algorithm employed is an adoption of the time-iteration procedure
with linear interpolation used in Grill and Brumm (2010). As we have
only two agents, a fine grid for wealth is enough to deliver satisfactorily
small Euler errors. For this reason, we do not adapt the grid around the
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points where the collateral constraint is binding, as proposed by Grill and
Brumm (2010).
2.6.3 Equilibrium conditions
We want to describe the equilibrium in our economy in terms of policy
functions that map the current state into current policies. Furthermore,
we want to focus on recursive mappings - that is, time-invariant func-
tions that satisfy the period-by-period first-order equilibrium conditions.
In what follows, we characterize these equilibrium conditions in every de-
tail. For each agent i = b, s, denote by νi(w, z) the Lagrange multiplier with
respect to her budget constraint and by φi(w, z) the Kuhn- Tucker mul-
tiplier attached to her collateral constraint. In addition, we treat saving
and debt as two separate assets: saving is an asset in which the agent can
only take long positions, si ≥ 0; debt is an asset with return RD in which
agents can only take short positions, di ≤ 0. Denote the Kuhn-Tucker
multipliers attached to these inequalities as χi and µi, respectively. Then,
for each tuple consisting of wealth and exogenous state today σ = (w, z),
the (time-invariant) policy and pricing functions have to satisfy the fol-
lowing system of equations (we will show below how to solve for these
time-invariant functions):
• Agent’s first order conditions
u1(ci(σ), hi(σ))− νi(σ) = 0
u2(ci(σ), hi(σ))− q(σ)νi(σ) = 0
−νi(σ) + βiE[νi(σ+)|σ]R(σ) + χi(σ) = 0, i = s, b
−νi(σ) + βiE[νi(σ+)|σ]RD + φi(σ)RD(w, z)− µi(σ) = 0
−νi(σ)q(σ) + u2(ci(σ), hi(σ))+
+βiE[νi(σ
+)q(σ+)]|σ] + φi(σ)mE[q(σ+)|σ] = 0
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• Agent’s budget constraints
nby(s) + nbΥ(σ) + w · q(σ)− db(σ)− sb(σ)− q(σ)hb(σ)− cb(σ) = 0
nsy(s) + nsΥ(σ) + (1− w) · q(σ)− ds(σ)− ss(σ)− q(σ)hs(σ)− cs(σ) = 0
NB: Here we have already used the definition for the borrower’s
wealth share and rewritten the budget constraints in these terms (see
the law of motion for wealth below as a reminder of how we defined
the wealth share).
• Zero profits in the financial sector
θ(s) ·RD(σ)−R(σ) = 0
• Market clearing in housing and financial sector
hs(σ) + hb(σ)− 1 = 0
db(σ) + ds(σ) + θ(s) · (sb(σ) + ss(σ)) = 0
• Transfers
Υ(σ)− (1− θ(s))(sb(σ) + ss(σ)) = 0
• Complementary slackness conditions
µi(σ) ≥ 0, di(σ) ≥ 0, µi(σ)⊥di(σ)
χi(σ) ≥ 0, si(σ) ≥ 0, χ(σ)⊥si(σ), i = s, b
φi(σ) ≥ 0, CCi(σ) ≥ 0, φi(σ)⊥CCi(σ)
where CCi(·) is the collateral constraint of agent i, that is,
CCi(σ) ≡ RD(σ)di(σ) +mE[q(σ+)|σ]hi(σ) ≥ 0
• Implicit “Law of motion” for borrower’s wealth share
w+(σ, z+) ≡ RD(σ)db(σ) +R(σ)sb(σ) + q(w
+(σ, z+), z+)hb(σ)
q(w+(σ, z+), z+)
.
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2.6.4 Algorithm
The structure of the above period-by-period equilibrium conditions can be
summarized as follows: Given a guess for the policy and pricing functions
in the next period - denoted by fprime - we can compute the expectations
in the agents’ first order conditions. The functions that map current states
to current policies - denoted by f - are then obtained by solving the static
system of non-linear given in the previous subsection. More formally, the
structure of the problem can be summarized as follows. For all tuples
σ = (w, z), we have
ψ(fprime)(σ, f(σ), µ(σ)) = 0, ζ(σ, f(σ)) ≥ 0⊥ µ(σ) ≥ 0.
The system of equationsψ[fprime](·) contains first order conditions of agents
and the financial sector and market clearing conditions. The function ζ(·)
contains the sign restrictions and collateral constraints. µ(·) denotes the
respective Kuhn-Tucker multipliers. A recursive policy function f then
solves ψ[f ](σ, f(σ)µ(σ)) = 0 such that the complementary slackness con-
ditions are satisfied. The time iteration algorithm defined below finds the
approximate recursive policy function iteratively.
In each iteration, taking as given a guess for fprime, we obtain f by solving
the above system of equations and then updating our guess by interpo-
lating the obtained policy function on the implicitly defined next period
wealth. The following box summarizes our algorithm in a form of Pseudo-
code:
1. Select a grid W , an initial guess f init and an error tolerance . Set
fprime = f init.
2. Make one time-iteration step:
(a) For all σ = (w, z), where w ∈ W , find the function f(σ) that
solves
ψ(fprime)(σ, f(σ), µ(σ)) = 0, ζ(σ, f(σ)) ≥ 0⊥ µ(σ) ≥ 0.
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(b) Use the solution f and the guess fprime to update wealth tomor-
row and interpolate f on the obtained values for wealth tomor-
row.
3. If ||f − fprime|| < , go to step 4. Else set fprime = f and repeat step 2.
4. Set numerical solution f˜ equal to the solution of the infinite horizon
problem, f˜ = f .
2.6.5 Kuhn-Tucker equations (Garcia-Zangwill trick)
At each grid point - given the guesses of the policy functions for the next
period - we have to solve a system of nonlinear equations, containing both
inequalities and equalities. The period-by-period equilibrium conditions
are basically standard Kuhn-Tucker (K-T) conditions. In order to employ
standard non-linear equation solvers like fsolve in Matlab or Ziena’s Kni-
tro, it is computationally more stable to eliminate the inequalities and re-
cast the problem as a system consisting of equations only. In this section
we describe how to do this. In general, we can write the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions of any convex NLP problem as:
∆f(x)′ +
r∑
j=1
λj∆gj(x)
′ +
s∑
j=1
µj∆hj(x)
′ = 0 (2.13)
λj ≥ 0, gj(x) ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , r
λjgj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , r
hj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , s
plus a constraint qualification restriction (CQ). The system in (2.13) are
mixtures of equalities and inequalities. Since inequalities tend to be cum-
bersome and can potentially prevent numerical software from solving the
NLP via path-following, we will rewrite the K-T conditions so that they
are a system consisting solely of equations Zangwill and Garcia (1981).
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The reformulation is as follows. Let k be a positive integer, and given
α ∈ R1, define:
α+ = [max{0, α}]k
α− = [max{0,−α}]k.
Hence, we always have α+ ≥ 0, α− ≥ 0, and α+α− = 0. Note also that
both variables, α+and α−, are (k − 1)-continuously differentiable. Using
this transformation, we can recast the K-T conditions and create the Kuhn-
Tucker equations Zangwill and Garcia (1981):
∆f(x)′ +
r∑
j=1
α+j ∆gj(x)
′ +
s∑
j=1
µj∆hj(x)
′ = 0 (2.14)
α−j − gj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , r
hj(x) = 0, j = 1, . . . , s
where α = (α1, . . . , αr) ∈ Rr and (α+, α−) are defined as above. Note
that the (K-T) equations defined here are precisely equivalent to the K-
T conditions in (2.13). In particular, if (x∗, α∗, µ∗) satisfies the K-T equa-
tions, then (x∗, λ∗, µ∗) satisfies the the K-T conditions with λ∗j ≡ (α∗j )+,
j = 1, . . . , r. Conversely, if (x∗, λ∗, µ∗) satisfies the K-T conditions in (2.13),
then (x∗, α∗, µ∗) satisfies the K-T equations in (2.14) with
α∗j ≡
(λ∗j)1/k if gj(x∗) = 0−(g(x∗)j)1/k if gj(x∗) > 0 j = 1, . . . , r.
2.6.6 Numerical Accuracy
In order to measure the accuracy of our approximation procedure, we cal-
culate two statistics: first, we compute the relative Euler errors along the
equilibrium path for very long time series. Second, for each exogenous
shock, we randomly draw 3000 points from the wealth grid and compute
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the relative Euler Errors. To summarize the findings: for all simulated
models, the maximum relative Euler Error is 3e-5 (or -4.5 in log(10)-scale).
This implies that an agent, using our approximation of the equilibrium
policy functions, would lose 30 Dollars for each million spent. It is impor-
tant to compare this number to the welfare gains we obtain in the bench-
mark model. The borrowers’ welfare loss on impact of an financial inter-
mediation shock is 0.07 percentage points, that is, in log(10) scale, equal to
-3.15. This number is one order of magnitude bigger, so even when net-
ting these numbers by the mistakes that agents make, we conclude that
our quantitative findings are still valid.
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2.7 Tables
Table 2.2: Calibration
Parameter Value Model Data Target Source
Preferences
γ 2 Benchmark value from literature
ρ 0 Benchmark value from literature
φ 0.97 196% 196% Average housing value over GDP (annualized) 1998 - 2009
βs 0.996 1.5% 1.5% Average return on savings (annualized)
βb 0.988 11.7% 11.3% Borrowers’ financial wealth share (SCFaverage 1998-2009)
m 0.5 45% 44.4% Borrowers’ leverage ratio (SCF average between 1998-2009)
Relative population size
nb 0.42 42% 42% Share of borrowers (SCF average 1998-2009)
Intermediation shock
piθH 0.565 56.5% Probability of low spreads during 1998-2009:II
ρθ 0.868 0.868 0.868 Autocorrelation of spreads during 1998-2009:II
θL 0.9985 1.8 % 1.75 % Average spread during 1998-2009:II (annualized)
θH 0.99207 1.27 % 1.27 % Standard deviation of spread during 1998-2009:II (annualized)
Income shock
piyH 0.85 15% 15% Probability of recession 1980- 2009:II (NBER dates)
piyLL 0.8 5 quarters 5 quarters Average duration of recession (NBER dates) 1980- 2009:II
yL 0.9572 5% 5% Average Peak to trough drop in GDP 1980- 2009:II
yH 1.0076 Normalization E(y) = 1
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Table 2.3: Welfare effects of a recession (5 percent drop in income) for dif-
ferent spread regimes
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
Great Recession -9.18 -29.47 -2.65 -1.19 -0.60 -0.01
Low spreads -8.59 -16.42 -6.07 -1.10 -0.50 -0.03
High spreads -9.00 -8.34 -9.15 -0.68 -0.41 -0.05
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
Great Recession -1.29 -9.54 1.00 -0.78 -0.24 0.03
Low spreads -1.01 -0.56 -1.13 -0.55 -0.15 0.01
High spreads -1.37 -8.79 0.69 -0.54 -0.18 0.02
Notes: Column two shows the percentage change of the house price between date −1 and date 0, the
period of the recession. Column three and four tabulate the percentage change in housing wealth between
date −1 and 0 for borrowers and savers, respectively. Column four tabulates the absolute change of the
borrowers’ wealth share between date −1 and date 0 (in percentage points). Columns six and seven show
the welfare gains of the recession in total consumption equivalents (relative to expected utility in period
−1) for borrowers and savers, respectively. The Great recession is defined as a contemporaneous drop in
income and financial intermediation (i.e. high spread) in period 0. The counterfactuals in row three (four)
assume that financial intermediation is high (low) in both periods −1 and 0.
99
Oliviero, Tommaso (2014), Financial intermediation and the great recession : microeconomic and macroeconomic issues 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11929
Table 2.4: Always binding collateral constraint
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
Great Recession -9.44 -16.72 -7.43 -0.95 -0.54 -0.03
Low spreads -8.65 -14.83 -6.94 -0.86 -0.46 -0.04
High spreads -8.58 -15.17 -6.86 -0.88 -0.47 -0.04
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
Great Recession -1.16 -5.73 0.06 -0.56 -0.18 0.02
Low spreads -1.21 -2.91 -0.75 -0.23 -0.09 -0.00
High spreads -1.05 -7.83 0.76 -0.83 -0.25 0.03
Notes: Column two is the change in house prices between period -1 (the period just before the shock
occurs) and period 7 (following the start of the recession). Column three shows borrowers’ start-of-period
leverage ratio, defined as LBoPb,t in the period of the shock t = 0; note that this leverage ratio is a
function of the price today only (variables with subscript t − 1 are given numbers). Column four shows
the corresponding change in borrowers’ financial wealth share between period -1 and period 7. Column
five reports the borrowers’ end-of-period leverage ratio, defined as LEoPt after the Great Recession - in
period t = 7. Columns six and seven show the welfare gains/losses of borrowers and savers, respectively.
All numbers are in percent.
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Table 2.5: Welfare effects in model with higher elasticity of substitution
between housing and non-durable consumption
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
Great Recession -9.10 -38.87 -0.34 -1.19 -0.57 -0.02
Low spreads -8.54 -17.83 -5.78 -1.12 -0.49 -0.03
High spreads -9.09 -6.71 -9.51 -0.47 -0.35 -0.06
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
Great Recession -0.96 -12.92 1.88 -0.82 -0.23 0.03
Low spreads -1.05 0.92 -1.52 -0.64 -0.16 0.02
High spreads -1.52 -11.74 0.90 -0.34 -0.13 0.00
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Table 2.6: Welfare effects of the Great Recession, different risk aversion
parameters
∆q ∆(qhb) ∆(qhs) ∆ωb λb λs
Data -11 -16 -9 ? ? ?
On impact, relative to pre-recession peak
γ = 1 -5.25 -22.52 -0.04 -0.60 -0.47 -0.04
γ = 2 (benchmark) -9.18 -29.47 -2.65 -1.19 -0.60 -0.01
γ = 3 -12.80 -35.83 -4.84 -1.84 -0.73 0.02
γ = 5 -19.21 -37.31 -14.21 -2.33 -1.09 0.04
After 7 periods, relative to long-run mean
γ = 1 -0.91 -6.95 0.72 -0.37 -0.15 0.01
γ = 2 (benchmark) -1.29 -9.54 1.00 -0.78 -0.24 0.03
γ = 3 -1.38 -11.79 1.62 -1.21 -0.32 0.05
γ = 5 -1.40 -12.91 1.44 -1.52 -0.51 0.07
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Chapter 3
CEO compensation, credit
crisis and financial regulation:
a cross-country analysis
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3.1 Introduction
The 2007-2009 Great Recession highlighted that capital market failures
may represent an important driver of economic downturns. There seems
to be a widespread agreement among researchers and practitioners that, at
the onset of the crisis, financial institutions took too much risk as a result
of the failure of risk management and financial regulation (see for instance
Diamond and Rajan (2009)). In particular, executive managers monetary
incentives have been identified as important examples of failures of gover-
nance in the banking industry. In the recent past, executive compensation
tied to firm performance such as bonuses related to firm value, stock op-
tions, or equity-plans have become standard tools of managerial remuner-
ation by shareholders in all sectors, and especially in banking (Giannetti
and Metzger (2013)1).
The theoretical literature has highlighted different mechanisms that shed
light on the relation between the pay-for-performance sensitivity of man-
agerial compensation risk taking that goes beyond what shareholders’ ob-
jectives. The model of Benmelech et al. (2010) builds on the assumption
that managers are able to hide the true state of the profitability of the
firm and maximize their own revenue from equity portfolio holdings; they
show that while executives’ stock-based compensation may increase the
alignment of managers’ and shareholders’ objectives, it may also induce
the managers to misreport the true state of the firm and concentrate on
short run, rather than long run, objectives. They also show that a combina-
tion of stock and bonuses may be the optimal compensation mix.2 Other
theoretical contributions build on the effect of leverage on risk-shifting
in the context of double agency conflict: first, between shareholders and
1They find that the increase in equity-based compensation and the consequent increase
in the total compensation is related to greater competition for talents that creates retention
motives and accentuates agency problems in the allocation of effort
2In light of these findings, in the empirical analysis we will consider separately the
effects of cash bonuses and equity-based compensations.
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debt-holders and second, between managers and shareholders. Cerasi and
Daltung (2007) show that the effect of bonuses tied to firm value may have
an ambiguous effect on risk-taking incentives for managers: on one side,
the higher the bonus, the higher the monitoring effort by managers and the
lower the risk taking; on the other side, a higher bonus substitutes the di-
rect monitoring of shareholders and therefore leads to greater risk taking.
This last mechanism may be exacerbated in the case of highly leveraged
firms such as banks.
Taken together, the predictions from the theoretical literature are far from
leading to a unique prediction. This calls for an empirical investigation,
especially in the banking sector following the financial crisis. On these
grounds, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) have empirically explored the re-
lation between CEO incentives and bank performance in the 2007-2008
financial crisis using a cross-section of US banks. They find that banks
where CEO incentives were better aligned with shareholders’ interests did
not perform better than other banks. They analyze the effects of differ-
ent components of remuneration packages such as stock options or cash
bonuses and conclude that none of them can explain the negative realiza-
tions of US bank returns during the downturn.
In the same spirit, in the first part of this paper, we empirically explore
the relation between CEO incentives and bank performance in the 2007-08
financial crisis in a sample of banks that operate in different countries. To
our knowledge this is the first paper that addresses this research question
from a cross-country perspective. A lack of evidence is certainly due to
the difficulties in the collection of data about CEO compensation schemes.
To overcome this problem, we match three sources of data: Capital IQ -
People Intelligence, Bankscope and Datastream3.
In the empirical analysis we separately consider the incentive effects given
by direct share ownership and stock options; the reason is that these two
equity-based compensation schemes may give rise to different incentives
3See section 3.2 for a detailed description of the data collection process.
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to take risk. On one side, stock options provide convex payoffs where
managers are insured on the downside; this may lead to excessive risk-
taking in leveraged firms (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Despite a large
number of studies, the sign of the relation between stock options and risk-
taking is still debated in the empirical literature, (see Gormley et al. (2013)).
On the other side, insider ownership should instead provide the most di-
rect alignment between managers’ and shareholders’ objectives (Murphy
(1990)).
We find that the sensitivity of CEO equity portfolios to share prices (op-
tion delta) in 2006 has strong predictive power over bank performance in
the financial crisis; a higher delta is related to a lower stock return and a
higher risk return. We use two measures of bank performance: 1) buy and
hold returns over the period 2007:III-2008:IV (the stock return); 2) the stan-
dard deviation of the stock returns over the same time window (the risk
return). The reason for using these two measures is that Guay (1999) finds
that firms equity risk is positively related to the convexity of the mone-
tary incentives provided to CEOs; in particular Coles et al. (2006) find that
the stock return volatility of risky investments is positively affected by the
deltas and vegas calculated on managers’ options.4
In the second part of the paper, thanks to the cross-country dimension
of our sample, we explore the interaction between CEO incentives and
national bank regulations.5 In particular, we concentrate our analysis on
four indicators of national regulation that may directly affect the intensity
of monitoring by bank stakeholders on managers: an index of the power
of the national supervisor, an index of the intensity of monitoring by the
private sector, the presence of explicit deposit insurance6, and the presence
4See 3.7 for a definition of option delta and vega and how they have been calculated.
5The data source is the Survey III posted on the World Bank website in the summer of
2007,which provides information on banking policies in 2006 for 142 countries; see Barth
et al. (2008) for a review.
6Following Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2005) we consider explicit deposit insurance differing
from implicit deposit insurance by the reliance on a formal definition in national banking
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of restrictions on bank activities.
The assumption is that, in different regulation systems: a) the risk shift-
ing propensity of managers due to monetary incentives may be lower be-
cause a stricter monitoring by the supervisor and/or by the private sector
may indirectly induce stricter monitoring by shareholders on managers; b)
shareholder - manager incentives are better aligned towards moral-hazard
behavior in countries with explicit deposit insurance, see Keeley (1990));
c) the possibility of investing in risky and opaque assets for banks is re-
stricted, possibly reducing shirking opportunities of managers.
Our results suggest that stricter monitoring slightly lowers the positive im-
pact of options delta on stock return volatility; moreover, insider owner-
ship by managers reduces the volatility of stock returns. The interpretation
is that insider ownership works in the direction of lowering the risk tak-
ing of managers when the intensity of outside monitoring is higher (John
and John (1993)). Furthermore we show that both stock options and direct
ownership may induce a higher propensity to risk-shift, and are related to
worse performance, in countries with explicit deposit insurance. In this
subset of countries, we find that both option delta and insider ownership
lead to lower returns and higher stock volatility in the financial crisis. Fi-
nally in countries where restrictions on bank activities are stronger, we
find that insider ownership leads to relatively better returns in the finan-
cial crisis. This last result, under the assumption that restrictions on assets
are related to increased transparency about bank investments, suggests
that a better alignment of CEOs and shareholders incentives leads to lower
risk taking when monitoring on managers’ is easier to pursue.
Our line of research complements Laeven and Levine (2009) who empiri-
cally analyzed the interaction between corporate governance and regula-
laws; explicit deposit insurance varies among countries by the application to different types
of financial institutions and by the amount of coverage. In this paper we consider the law
that applies to commercial banks; we furthermore assume that the insurance is funded
with a fair premium paid by the commercial bank. Although restrictive, this assumption
seems to fit the application of this law by the majority of countries.
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tion and its effect on bank risk taking. They find that more concentrated
ownership induces higher risk taking and that this relation varies with
national regulations. In particular, concentrated ownership boosts risk
taking in countries with greater restrictions on bank activities and with
explicit deposit insurance. Unlike Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), we find
a negative relation between option compensation and performance in the
financial crisis. This may be related to the fact that their analysis is concen-
trated only on US banks and that the cross-sectional variability is not big
enough in the Great Recession, when both the financial markets and the
overall economy crashed deeply. Our paper contributes to the recent liter-
ature on the role of banks’ corporate governance on performance during
the recent financial crisis. Ellul and Yeramilli (2013) studied the impact of
heterogeneity in risk management functions at the bank level in the US on
tail risk. Moreover, in a cross-country analysis, Beltratti and Stulz (2012)
show that shareholders have effectively aligned bank managers to their
interests at the expense of depositors in the recent financial crisis.
One major concern in this kind of analysis is related to endogeneity: man-
ager compensation may in fact be designed by shareholders in anticipation
of a predictable risk; in such a case, reverse causality represents one of the
major challenges faced by the econometrician. We are interested in docu-
menting the relation between CEO monetary incentives, bank regulations
and crisis performance. We argue that in our empirical setup, endogeneity
concerns due to reverse causality are mitigated by two concurrent reasons:
1) we regress crisis performance variables on lagged pre-crisis variables;
2) the financial crisis can be hardly classified as an anticipated shock. Both
market operators and managers were arguably unaware in 2006 of the
coming crisis in mid-2007. We, in fact, show that banks’ stock returns
in 2006 were positive and extremely high; in addition, the quarterly aver-
age of insider ownership by CEOs in our sample did change between 2006
and 2007, but the difference is not statistically significant7. This last piece
7The quarterly average of insider holding has been 1.7% and 1.5% respectively at the
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of evidence confirms the conjecture that bank managers were not aware of
the coming financial crisis even in the early quarters of 2007.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 3.2 describes the
dataset; section 3.3 provides some descriptive statistics on the sample of
banks and CEO compensation; section 3.4 documents the relation between
bank performance in the financial crisis and realized CEO compensation;
section 3.5 studies the interaction between CEO incentives and national
regulation; and section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data sources
We build a new database by matching four different sources of data. The
final goal of the paper is to obtain a panel where each observation rep-
resents a Bank-CEO-Year-Country quadruple. In particular, we want to
combine information at bank level (such as balance sheet) with informa-
tion on compensation at CEO level, for different points in time and for
different countries. One issue with building such a dataset is the difficulty
in matching different sources absent direct linkages between databases. In
order to link accounting and performance data with CEO compensation
data, we merge observations from two different sources: Bankscope8 and
Capital IQ - People Intelligence9. From Capital IQ we initially select all
commercial banks, saving institutions (SIC codes: 6020, 6021, 6029, 6036)
and bank holding companies (BHCs which SIC code is 6719) for which the
compensation of CEOs is observed for at least one year over the period
end of 2006 and of 2007.
8A directory and financial reporting service on 30,000 banks worldwide provided by
Bureau van Dijk. It provides standardized reports, ratings, and ownership data as well as
financial analysis functions.
9A database provided by Standard and Poor on the profiles of public and private firms
worldwide including financials, officers and directors, ownership, advisory relationships,
transactions, securities, key developments, estimates, key documents, credit ratings and
filings.
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2005-2009; from BHCs we exclude those banks whose primary specializa-
tion is brokerage and financial services (SIC codes 6162, 6199, 6200 and
6211). We then match this group of selected banks with the top ten largest
publicly listed banks as defined by their total assets. We select the top ten
banks for each year from 2005 to 2009. This selection process allows us to
include in the sample banks that eventually disappeared during the crisis
because of mergers and acquisitions or default. We end up with 126 banks
from 28 countries. The final list of banks is in table 3.1. Not surprisingly,
the majority of observed banks are from countries where the disclosure
of manager compensation is mandatory (the USA and Canada, for exam-
ple). Sample size is a common problem in this kind of study (Fahlenbrach
and Stulz (2011) and Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). We prefer to keep the
total number of observations relatively low rather than incur the risk of
over-representation of some countries. As argued by Laeven and Levine
(2009), the benefit of focusing on the largest banks is mainly related to
an enhanced comparability between banks from different countries. The
largest corporations tend, in fact, to comply with international accounting
standards. This concern is even stronger in our case because in some coun-
tries, the disclosure of manager compensation in the annual reports is rec-
ommended by the authority but not compulsory. The third source of data
is represented by Datastream, from which we obtain information about
stock returns and equity prices at daily and weekly frequency. Finally, we
add information about countries’ financial regulations using some mea-
sures from the third Survey by the World Bank discussed in Barth et al.
(2008). A more detailed list of variables used in the following sections is
available in Appendix 3.7.1.
3.3 Descriptive statistics
In this section, we provide descriptive statistics for both the sample of
banks and CEO compensations. In particular, in the following section, we
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examine accounting statistics at the end of 2006 and performance statistics
in the period from the end of October 2007 to the end of December 2008 for
the selected banks; later we examine summary statistics of CEO compen-
sations and equity ownership at the end of 2006. Notice that all variables
have been converted into US dollars at the end of the year.
3.3.1 Banks
Table 3.4 shows the descriptive statistics for the selected sample of banks.
Notice that the total number of observations changes across variables be-
cause they are taken from different data sources. The total number of
banks in the sample is quite limited; this results from two main reasons: 1)
these are the banks for which we observe the CEO compensation in 2006;
2) the matching of different data sources inevitably leads the loss of some
observations. We end up with a sample of large banks: the value of to-
tal assets is much bigger than in related papers, which concentrate on a
sample of US banks. The Tier 1 capital ratio is not observed for all banks.
The difference between the minimum and the maximum amount Tier 1 is
explained by the differences in bank regulations across countries10. Given
this heterogeneity we will insert this variable as a control in our analysis -
though it is not observed in more than 10% of the observations in our sam-
ple. The positive book to market ratio signals that banks were potentially
growing in 2006 and that the huge drop in stock returns from 2007:III was
an unexpected event. Panel B highlights the summary statistics for our
performance indicators, which will be used in the regression analysis. The
average buy and hold return in the period 2007:III-2008:IV is about -47%;
this highlights how deep the financial crisis has been for the banking sec-
tor worldwide.
Insert Table 3.4 here
10For example, in Europe it is 8%, while in the US it is 6%
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3.3.2 CEO compensations
Table 3.5 provides descriptive statistics about the compensation packages
and the value of equity portfolios for the CEOs employed in 2006 in the
sample of selected banks described above. Panel A summarizes the var-
ious components of total compensation. While cash bonuses linked to
bank performance are commonly included in managers’ compensation
contracts all around the world, equity bonuses are less common (in 2006
the median bank did not award an equity bonus in the form of shares,
restricted shares or options). Moreover, cash bonuses account for 43% of
total compensation on average and are larger than total salary for half of
our sample of banks. Panel B highlights that, on average, CEO insider
ownership is about 1.4%, while the median value of their total equity port-
folio (which includes the value of options and restricted shares) is about 7
million dollars. We also find that about 35% of banks used stock options
in their compensation packages. The value of these components suggests
us that it is important to consider the impact on CEO incentives given by
these variables.
Insert Table 3.5 here
3.4 Credit crisis and CEO compensations
In this section we document the relation between bank performance in the
period 2007:III - 2008:IV and the various components of CEO compensa-
tions measured in the fiscal year 2006 using the following specification of
OLS regression model:
Performancei,07−08 = α + βCEOcompensationi,2006 + γControlsi,2006 + i
(3.1)
In the analysis below we will consider two indicators of performance as
dependent variables: the buy and hold return of each bank stock price and
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the standard deviation of equity returns. We decided to exclude the first
two quarters of 200911 in the measures of performance because bank re-
turns in this last part of the recession may have been strongly affected by
national recovery policies. On the right hand side of equation 3.1, as CEO
compensation variables, we will separately consider measures of short
term incentives (cash bonus over total salary) and measures of longer term
incentives (equity portfolio positions) to capture the different roles given
by different components of CEO compensation. Among the equity posi-
tions, we will distinguish between the incentives given by insider own-
ership and stock options. As we will show, these two components may,
under certain conditions, work in opposite directions. The reason is that
stock options give convex payoffs to the manager that is insured on the
downside. On the other hand, insider ownership should perfectly align
the incentives of managers and shareholders because the former group
fully bear the costs of a negative realization of stock prices. Moreover, as
standard in the corporate finance literature, we will separately consider
the effects of option deltas and option vegas. Finally, we will exclude from
the analysis the equity bonuses awarded in 2006; the reason is that these
awards implicitly enter in the portfolio of stock options or of unrestricted
shares accumulated and held by each CEO at the end of 2006.
3.4.1 Stock performance
In this section we consider as dependent variables the buy and hold re-
turns in the period 2007:III - 2008:IV. Table 3.6 summarizes the results.
Insert Table 3.6 here
In columns (1) to (3) we separately consider the relation between stock
performance and each component of CEO compensation. In column (4)
we consider all of the CEO compensation components and we add as con-
trols: the market return of stock price between 2005 and 2006, the book
11The NBER dates of the Great Recession are 2007:III-2009:II
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to market ratio and leverage ratio evaluated at book value (all these vari-
ables are measured at the end of 2006, see Appendix3.7.1 for variable def-
initions). In column (5) we add the Tier 1 Regulatory Capital ratio, which
is a measure of capital adequacy and liquidity; although we lose some ob-
servations by including this variable, it is an important control because it
has been found that better capitalized banks performed better during the
financial crisis (Beltratti and Stulz (2012)). The analysis highlights a strong
predictive power for the delta of options: an increase in 1% points in delta
option is related to a decrease of about 0.2% in stock return. This result
points to the risk-taking incentive effect of stock options: banks that re-
munerated CEOs with more stock options in 2006 performed worse in the
financial crisis. The results also suggest that better performing banks in
2006 performed worse in 2007-2008 (book to market ratio) and that better
capitalized (higher Tier 1) performed better.
3.4.2 Risk return
In this section we replicate the analysis of the previous section taking as
dependent variable the variability of stock returns. Throughout the cur-
rent paper we will use two measures of performance. The reason is that
the convexity of monetary returns may affect not only the return of invest-
ments but also the riskiness (Guay (1999) and Coles et al. (2006)). Results
are in Table 3.7. We show that stock option incentives did not only im-
pact on the return of equity but also on its volatility. Moreover, in contrast
to the results of the previous section, in columns (2) and (4), we show a
statistically significant negative effect from insider ownership. Higher in-
sider holding is associated with a lower volatility of stock returns. Those
results confirm that different equity remuneration policies may give dif-
ferent incentives and result in opposite outcomes. In particular, given that
direct ownership does not insure the CEO in the case of big losses, it has
provided the incentive not to invest in high return - high risky assets.
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Insert Table 3.7 here
3.5 The effect of financial regulation
We interprete the results of previous sections as the evidence that weak
monitoring, combined with pay-for-performance compensation for man-
agers, lead to higher risk-taking by managers. In this second part of the
empirical analysis we will validate this interpretation by working on the
interaction between regulation and CEO monetary incentives. The reason
for conducting this analysis is twofold. First, different regulation allows
us to test wether supervision efficiency by shareholders and remuneration
policies in 2006 jointly explains the cross-sectional differences in perfor-
mance. Secondly, this analysis complements previous work on the effects
of corporate governance and regulation on risk-taking and sheds new light
on the mechanisms that may induce CEOs to take excessive risks in the
eyes of regulators. Accordingly, in the current section, we provide evi-
dence on the relation between performance and monetary incentives in
different regulatory environments. We exploit some of the information
provided by the World Bank III Survey on the regulatory regimes of dif-
ferent countries in 2006. In particular, in the sub-section below we will
consider the effects of the intensity of monitoring and, in the final subsec-
tion, we will analyze the effects of deposit insurance and restrictions on
bank activities.
3.5.1 The effect of monitoring
We consider two measures of intensity of monitoring: monitoring by the
national supervisor and by the private sector. In the current analysis,
we want to study the effects of CEO monetary incentives in an environ-
ment where the intensity of monitoring is relatively higher. We assume
that these two measures of intensity of monitoring directly affects the effi-
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ciency of supervision by bank shareholders on managers. We want to see
if greater monitoring may reduce the risk-shifting incentive given by CEO
remuneration. To this end, we restrict our regression analysis to banks in
countries where those indexes are above the median. Results are in Table
3.8.
Insert Table 3.8 here
Columns (1) and (2) show the effects of CEO monetary incentives on stock
return and risk for the group of banks in countries with stricter monitoring
by the financial supervisor, while columns (3) and (4) show the effects for
banks in countries with higher monitoring by the private sector. Results in
columns (1) and (3) suggests that the relation between option delta in 2006
and buy and hold returns in 2007-2008 is still positive with stronger mon-
itoring. However this effect is lower in magnitude in the case of stronger
monitoring by the private sector. At the same time, both in columns (2)
and (4) it is showed that the impact of option delta on risk return is lower
in magnitude with stronger monitoring. Similarly we find that the effect
of insider ownership on volatility of stock returns is lower in magnitude
and statistically significant with respect to the whole sample. We conclude
that we do find evidence that the risk taking incentive given by pay-for-
performance is lower with stronger outside monitoring.
3.5.2 Deposit insurance and restriction on bank activ-
ities
As in the previous section, here we proceed with a regression analysis by
conditioning on countries where there was explicit deposit insurance in
2006 and on countries where restrictions on bank activities were stronger
(in countries where the index is above the median). Results are in Table
3.9. The presence of deposit insurance provides an ideal environment for
studying the effects of monetary incentives when there is explicit room for
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moral hazard behavior. Keeley (1990) argues that the reason is that banks
can borrow from depositors at a very low risk free rate and invest the pro-
ceeds in risky assets. By opposite, we assume that restrictions on bank
activities may increase transparency and lower the cost of monitoring by
shareholders and lower the risk taking. Results are in Table 3.9; the anal-
ysis with deposit insurance and asset restrictions are shown in columns
(1)-(2) and (3)-(4) respectively.
Insert Table 3.9 here
Results suggest that, in presence of deposit insurance, shareholder and
manager objectives are effectively aligned towards high risk shifting to
borrowers; in fact, we find that both delta options and direct ownership
lead to lower returns and higher stock volatility during the financial crisis.
By contrast, in countries where restrictions on bank activities are stronger,
there is a positive relation between insider ownership and bank perfor-
mance. This last result suggests that a better alignment of CEOs and share-
holders incentives are more powerful in determining bank performance
monitoring on bank investments is easier and, by opposite, shirking by
managers is more difficult to pursue.
3.6 Conclusions
This paper contributes to the recent literature about the determinants of
bank performance in different countries during the recent financial crisis.
We find that monetary incentives given to managers in 2006 affected per-
formance: while delta option lead to worse performance (both in stock re-
turn and risk return), direct insider ownership was related to less volatility
in the stock returns. By exploiting cross-country heterogeneity in banking
regulation, we find that higher pay for performance sensitivity in CEO
remuneration is a powerful determinant of bad performance in countries
with explicit deposit insurance; the opposite is true in countries where
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there is stricter monitoring on bank activities by outside stakeholders. This
paper represents a first step towards the study of the joint relation between
bank risk taking, CEO monetary incentives, and financial regulation from
empirical point of view. A deeper understanding of these interactions may
have policy implications in the current debate about new regulations for
banks and for managerial compensations.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Definition of key variables and Data source
Compensation - Capital IQ
• Total salary: amount paid as salary for the year 2006
• Cash bonus: amount paid as bonus for the year 2006
• Equity bonus: it is the sum of bonus not paid in cash in the year
2006; it comprises restricted stock awards, stock grant awards, op-
tion awards
• Total annual compensation: Total salary + Cash Bonus + Equity Bonus
+ other annual compensation in not specified categories
• Insider ownership: it is the ratio between insider ownership (source:
Capital IQ) and total number of shares of the company (source: Datas-
tream)
• Total value of options: it is the value of options calculated using the
Black and Scholes formula; the exercise price and the expiration year
is provided by Capital IQ; the share price at the end of year is down-
loaded from Datastream; the risk-free interest rate is the 10-year ma-
turity interest rate on US bonds (source: Federal Reserve). The total
number of options is given by the sum of exercisable options, un-
exercisable options, unearned and unexercised options, unexercised
options.
• Value of total portfolio: It is the market value of insider equity (num-
ber of shares multiplied by the equity price at the end of the year), the
total value of options and the total value of restricted shares (evalu-
ated at the end of the year)
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• Delta of options: sensitivity of CEO option portfolio value to share
price. It is the weighted sum of the deltas of each option award in
different years; the weights are determined by the number of each
option award divided by total number of option in 2006.
• Vega of options: sensitivity of CEO option portfolio value to stock
return volatility. It is the weighted sum of the deltas of each option
award in different years; the weights are determined by the number
of each option award divided by total number of option in 2006.
Accounting - Bankscope
• Total Assets: Total earning assets plus Cash and due from banks plus
Foreclosed real estate plus Fixed assets plus Goodwill plus Other in-
tangibles plus Current tax assets plus deferred tax plus Discontinued
operations plus Other assets in 2006
• Total Liabilities: Total interest-bearing liabilities plus Fair value por-
tion of debt plus Credit impairment reserves plus Reserves for pen-
sion and other plus Tax liabilities plus Other deferred liabilities plus
Discontinued operations plus Insurance plus Other non-interest-bearing
liabilities in 2006
• Total Equity: Common equity plus Non-controlling interest plus Se-
curities revaluation reserves plus Foreign Exchange Revaluation Re-
serves plus Other revaluation reserves in 2006
• Leverage (book value): Total equity over total assets in 2006
• Net income: pre-tax profit in 2006
• Book to Market ratio: Market value of equity (total number of shares
multiplied by end of year price of share - source Datastream) over
Total equity
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• Tier1 Capital ratio: This is regulatory measure of capital adequacy.
That is shareholder funds plus perpetual non cumulative preference
shares as a percentage of risk weighted assets and off balance sheet
risks measured under the Basel rules.
• Tangible asset ratio: This is like a pure leverage ratio but it removes
goodwill or any other intangible asset from both equity and the asset
side of the balance sheet as in difficulty a banks’s intangible may be
worthless.
Stock data - Datastream
• Buy and hold return 2007-2008: buy and hold return on banks’ stock
over the period 2007:III-2008:IV
• Risk return 2007-2008: standard deviation of weekly returns over the
period 2007:III-2008:IV
Regulation data - World Bank
• Private monitoring: an index of monitoring on the part of the private
sector; we will consider a dummy equal to 1 if the value is above the
median in our sample.
• Official: an index of the power of banking supervisor authority; we
will consider a dummy equal to 1 if the value is above the median in
our sample.
• Deposit insurance: dummy variable equal to 1 if the country has an
explicit deposit insurance
• Restrict: an index of restrictions by national regulator on banks’ ac-
tivities; ; we will consider a dummy equal to 1 if the value is above
the median in our sample.
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3.8 Tables
Table 3.1: List of Banks
Name of the bank Country
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited AUSTRALIA
National Australia Bank Limited AUSTRALIA
Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Limited AUSTRALIA
Bank of Queensland Ltd. AUSTRALIA
Westpac Banking Corporation AUSTRALIA
Commonwealth Bank of Australia AUSTRALIA
Erste Group Bank AG AUSTRIA
Pubali Bank Ltd. BANGLADESH
Dexia SA BELGIUM
The Toronto-Dominion Bank CANADA
Laurentian Bank of Canada CANADA
Royal Bank of Canada CANADA
The Bank of Nova Scotia CANADA
Home Capital Group Inc. CANADA
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CANADA
National Bank of Canada CANADA
Bank of Montreal CANADA
Canadian Western Bank CANADA
China Merchants Bank Co., Ltd. CHINA
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited CHINA
China Construction Bank Corporation CHINA
Bank of China Limited CHINA
Komercni Banka AS CZECH REPUBLIC
Danske Bank A/S DENMARK
Credit Agricole S.A. FRANCE
BNP Paribas SA FRANCE
Natixis FRANCE
Societe Generale Group FRANCE
Commerzbank AG GERMANY
Aareal Bank AG GERMANY
Deutsche Postbank AG GERMANY
Deutsche Bank AG GERMANY
Dah Sing Financial Holdings Limited HONG KONG
Hang Seng Bank Limited HONG KONG
The Bank of East Asia, Limited HONG KONG
Wing Hang Bank Limited HONG KONG
BOC Hong Kong Holdings Ltd. HONG KONG
Chong Hing Bank Limited HONG KONG
Dah Sing Banking Group Limited HONG KONG
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Table 3.2: List of Banks 2, continued
Name of the bank Country
Bank of Baroda INDIA
ICICI Bank Ltd. INDIA
Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited INDIA
Oriental Bank of Commerce INDIA
HDFC Bank Ltd. INDIA
Allied Irish Banks, p.l.c. IRELAND
The Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland IRELAND
Israel Discount Bank Limited ISRAEL
Bank Leumi Le-Israel BM ISRAEL
First International Bank of Israel Ltd. ISRAEL
Mizrahi Tefahot Bank, Ltd. ISRAEL
Union Bank of Israel Ltd. ISRAEL
Bank Hapoalim B.M. ISRAEL
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa ITALY
Banca Popolare di Sondrio ITALY
UniCredit S.p.A. ITALY
Banco Popolare Societa Cooperativa Scarl ITALY
Banca Carige S.p.A. ITALY
Banca popolare dell’Emilia Romagna ITALY
Arab Bank plc JORDAN
Capital Bank of Jordan JORDAN
Bank of Jordan JORDAN
Cairo Amman Bank JORDAN
Malayan Banking Berhad MALAYSIA
FNB Namibia Holdings Limited NAMIBIA
Van Lanschot NV NETHERLANDS
SpareBank 1 SR-Bank NORWAY
Sandnes Sparebank NORWAY
SpareBank 1 SMN NORWAY
NIB Bank Limited PAKISTAN
Faysal Bank Limited PAKISTAN
Habib Metropolitan Bank Limited PAKISTAN
United Bank Ltd. PAKISTAN
Bank Al Habib Limited PAKISTAN
Bank Alfalah Limited PAKISTAN
Allied Bank Limited PAKISTAN
MCB Bank Ltd. PAKISTAN
Askari Bank Limited PAKISTAN
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Table 3.3: List of Banks 3, continued
Name of the bank Country
Bank Polska Kasa Opieki POLAND
Bank Millennium Spolka Akcyjna POLAND
BRE Bank SA POLAND
Bank Zachodni WBK SA POLAND
Bank Handlowy W Warszawie SA POLAND
Absa Group Limited SOUTH AFRICA
Standard Bank Group Limited SOUTH AFRICA
Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd. SOUTH AFRICA
FirstRand Limited SOUTH AFRICA
Sasfin Holdings Limited SOUTH AFRICA
Cadiz Holdings Ltd. SOUTH AFRICA
Nedbank Group Limited SOUTH AFRICA
Banco Popular Espanol S.A. SPAIN
Banco Santander, S.A. SPAIN
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. SPAIN
Nordea Bank AB (publ) SWEDEN
Swedbank AB SWEDEN
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB (publ) SWEDEN
Svenska Handelsbanken AB SWEDEN
HSBC Holdings plc UNITED KINGDOM
Standard Chartered PLC UNITED KINGDOM
Paragon Group of Companies plc UNITED KINGDOM
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group plc UNITED KINGDOM
Arbuthnot Banking Group PLC UNITED KINGDOM
Barclays PLC UNITED KINGDOM
Lloyds Banking Group plc UNITED KINGDOM
U.S. Bancorp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Fifth Third Bancorp UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SunTrust Banks, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Regions Financial Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BBandT Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Citigroup, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
JPMorgan Chase and Co. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Bank of America Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The PNC Financial Services Group, Inc. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Wells Fargo and Company UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
SLM Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics for the sample of banks
Mean St. Dev. Median Number Min. Max.
Panel A:Accounting data
Total Assets 288935.2 544937 61590.9 126 204.0783 3480005
Total Liabilities 272384.1 515539 56701.26 126 112.2349 3246247
Total Equity 15019.78 29238.37 4117.332 126 62.12338 210170.2
Leverage (book value) .0775749 .0508819 .0654814 126 .0209757 .4508393
Net income over total asset .0133372 .0119696 .0104837 126 .0027138 .0919265
Book to Market ratio 1.471307 4.168797 .6321529 120 .0478978 32.13791
Tier1 Capital ratio 9.682818 3.208868 8.66 110 5.5 23.8
Tangible asset ratio 6.478413 4.654734 5.45 126 1.37 42.56
Panel B:Perfomance indicators
Buy and hold return 2007-2008 -.4722741 .2772084 -.4775868 121 -.9594446 .6239023
Risk return 2007-2008 .0664083 .0198854 .0639792 121 .0329217 .1567338
The table provides summary statistics for the sample of banks selected according to criteria described in Section 2. The
list of banks and the definition of the variables are in the Appendix. All variables in Panel A are measured in million of
US dollars at the end of Fiscal Year 2006. Original variables used to obtain performance indicators in Panel B has been
downloaded from Datastream in US dollars.
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics for CEO compensations
Mean Median
Panel A:Compensation 2006
Total salary 6014365 725616.2
Cash bonus 1305616 331126.3
Equity bonus 1264812 0
Total annual compensation 8737911 1290499
Bonus over total compensation .4314459 .4925723
Cash bonus over total salary .7637955 1
Panel B:Equity portfolio 2006
Insider ownership .0138157 .0001
Total value of options 7324591 0
Value of total portfolio 2.19e+07 725392
Delta of options .0641493 0
Vega of options .0035714 0
The table provides summary statistics for the sample of the com-
pensation and the portfolio of equity of CEOs appointed in the
selected banks in 2006. The definition of the variables are in the
Appendix. All variables in Panel A and Panel B are measured in
US dollars at the end of Fiscal Year 2006.
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Table 3.6: Estimation results: Buy and hold returns 2007:III-2008:IV (BHR 0708)
Dependent variable: BHR 0708
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cash salary 2006 -0.0120 0.00209 0.0122
(0.0106) (0.0107) (0.00929)
insider 2006 0.357 0.0695 -0.268
(0.382) (0.273) (0.317)
option delta 2006 -0.149∗∗∗ -0.200∗∗ -0.184∗∗
(0.0381) (0.0940) (0.0722)
option vega 2006 0.231 -0.279 1.329
(1.406) (1.702) (0.966)
market return 2006 -0.301∗∗∗ -0.292∗∗∗
(0.1000) (0.0945)
book to market 2006 0.0119 0.0128
(0.0157) (0.0161)
leverage market 2006 0.102 -0.00474
(0.233) (0.185)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 2006 0.0283∗∗∗
(0.00573)
Constant -0.455∗∗∗ -0.478∗∗∗ -0.463∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗ -0.689∗∗∗
(0.0313) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0536) (0.0663)
N 121 120 121 118 102
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All covariates are
measured in US dollars at the end of Fiscal Year 2006.
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Table 3.7: Estimation results: Risk return 2007:III-2008:IV (RR 0708)
Dependent variable: RR 0708
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
cash salary 2006 0.00101 -0.000420 -0.000358
(0.000698) (0.000737) (0.000737)
insider 2006 -0.0546∗∗∗ -0.0356∗∗∗ -0.0168
(0.0106) (0.0135) (0.0154)
option delta 2006 0.0134∗∗∗ 0.0159∗∗ 0.0147∗∗
(0.00463) (0.00652) (0.00584)
option vega 2006 0.0972 0.138 -0.0193
(0.172) (0.194) (0.0700)
market return 2006 0.0200∗∗∗ 0.0237∗∗∗
(0.00661) (0.00482)
book to market 2006 -0.000459 -0.000367
(0.000646) (0.000627)
leverage market 2006 -0.00117 0.000784
(0.0146) (0.0114)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio2006 -0.000975∗
(0.000498)
Constant 0.0649∗∗∗ 0.0672∗∗∗ 0.0652∗∗∗ 0.0614∗∗∗ 0.0678∗∗∗
(0.00207) (0.00187) (0.00177) (0.00323) (0.00552)
N 121 120 121 118 102
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All covariates are measured
in US dollars at the end of Fiscal Year 2006.
130
Oliviero, Tommaso (2014), Financial intermediation and the great recession : microeconomic and macroeconomic issues 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/11929
Table 3.8: Estimation results: External Monitoring
National supervisor Private sector
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BHR 0708 RR 0708 BHR 0708 RR 0708
cash salary 2006 0.0167 -0.000132 0.0108 -0.000235
(0.0120) (0.000783) (0.0101) (0.000779)
insider 2006 0.269 -0.0431∗ -0.338 -0.0266∗
(0.196) (0.0248) (0.290) (0.0140)
option delta 2006 -0.257∗∗∗ 0.0122∗∗ -0.167∗∗ 0.0142∗∗
(0.0893) (0.00563) (0.0707) (0.00575)
option vega 2006 0.914 -0.0508 1.087 -0.0288
(1.104) (0.0645) (1.024) (0.0697)
market return 2006 -0.194∗ 0.0135∗∗∗ -0.349∗∗∗ 0.0199∗∗∗
(0.0976) (0.00462) (0.106) (0.00437)
book to market 2006 0.0355∗∗∗ -0.00107∗∗∗ 0.0157 -0.000191
(0.00231) (0.000111) (0.0169) (0.000682)
leverage market 2006 0.182 -0.00600 -0.0614 -0.0000738
(0.234) (0.0142) (0.177) (0.0106)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 2006 0.0235∗∗∗ -0.000459 0.0301∗∗∗ -0.000688
(0.00632) (0.000460) (0.00607) (0.000478)
Constant -0.674∗∗∗ 0.0686∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ 0.0665∗∗∗
(0.0817) (0.00567) (0.0774) (0.00585)
N 62 62 77 77
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All covariates
are measured in US dollars at the end of Fiscal Year 2006.
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Table 3.9: Estimation results: Deposit Insurance and Restrictions on bank ac-
tivities
Deposit insurance Restriction on activities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BHR 0708 RR 0708 BHR 0708 RR 0708
cash salary2006 0.0165∗ -0.000559 0.0114 -0.000211
(0.00972) (0.000857) (0.0102) (0.000776)
insider 2006 -1.146∗∗∗ 0.0549∗ 0.432∗∗ -0.0295
(0.325) (0.0301) (0.187) (0.0219)
option delta 2006 -0.214∗∗ 0.0254∗∗∗ -0.237∗ 0.0143∗∗∗
(0.0913) (0.00644) (0.138) (0.00432)
option vega 2006 0.675 0.0685 1.207 -0.00648
(2.027) (0.178) (0.989) (0.0693)
market return 2006 -0.244 0.0368∗∗ -0.111 0.0179∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.0146) (0.0920) (0.00464)
book to market 2006 -0.00916∗ 0.000170 0.0280∗∗∗ -0.00121∗∗∗
(0.00500) (0.000374) (0.00878) (0.000292)
leverage market 2006 0.102 -0.0280∗ 0.206 -0.00642
(0.227) (0.0147) (0.368) (0.0139)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio 2006 0.0543∗∗∗ -0.00388∗∗ 0.0211∗∗ -0.000129
(0.0170) (0.00148) (0.00808) (0.000426)
Constant -0.964∗∗∗ 0.0924∗∗∗ -0.667∗∗∗ 0.0609∗∗∗
(0.176) (0.0157) (0.0746) (0.00488)
N 63 63 64 64
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. All covariates
are measured in US dollars at the end of Fiscal Year 2006.
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